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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 17, 1954 the Supreme Court handed down two 
decisions that for the first time categorically held that racial 
segregation in public schools was per se unlawful.1  One of these 
decisions is known to nearly every American citizen from primary 
school up.2  The other, though no less important, is merely an 
afterthought in the civics classes.3  It is known mostly to lawyers, and 
 
* Associate Professor of Law; Co-Director, Center for Medicine & Law, University of 
Baltimore School of Law.  J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; M.D., SUNY-
Stony Brook School of Medicine; B.A., Johns Hopkins University.  I want to thank 
Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Garrett Epps, C.J. Peters, Irina Manta, and Tara Helfman for 
their help and comments on this paper.   
 1  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954).  
 2  See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks at the Rededication Ceremony, University Of 
Illinois College Of Law,  1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 11, 15–16 (1995) (noting that law students 
re-enacted the Brown argument “to teach junior high school students about that 
historic decision”). 
 3  See, e.g., Phoebe Weaver Williams, Reflections on Wisconsin’s Brown Experience, 89 
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even then, often simply by reference to the first one.4  I am, of course, 
talking about Brown v. Board of Education5 and Bolling v. Sharpe.6  
Ostensibly, both cases dealt with the same question—is racial 
segregation permissible in the context of public education?7  Yet, the 
cases were not consolidated for oral argument.8  Instead, the cases 
were argued on separate, though consecutive days.9  The reason 
behind the lack of consolidation is that in Brown the entity accused of 
discrimination was a creature of the State of Kansas, while in Bolling 
the discrimination was practiced by the government of the District of 
Columbia—a federal enclave.10  For those untrained in law, the 
distinction would seem to be of no consequence, yet lawyers know 
better.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “equal 
protection of the laws” applies, by its own terms only to the states and 
not to the federal government.11  Whatever one thought at the time of 
the Equal Protection Clause’s constraints on the behavior of the 
various states, one had to admit that, absent serious judicial and legal 
 
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (discussing how “[n]umerous academic, civic, legal, and 
media organizations designated the year 2004, the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,” but not of Bolling v. Sharpe).  
The entire article refers to Bolling only once when stating that “[v]arious shorthand 
references to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown often obscure the reality that 
Brown consists of a collection of cases.” Id. at 23.  
 4  See id. at 23. 
 5  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 6  347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 7  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (order restoring cases to the 
docket and delineating the questions presented).  Note that the questions presented 
were the same for Brown and for Bolling.  Id.  Indeed, in the order no difference 
between Brown and Bolling is cited and the Fifth Amendment is not even mentioned.  
See also Brown v. Board of Education, 344 U.S. 1, 2 (1953) (“[T]he nature of the issue 
posed in those appeals [Brown and consolidated cases] now before the Court 
involving the Fourteenth Amendment, and also the effect of any decision which it 
may render in those cases, are such that it would be well to consider, simultaneously, 
the constitutional issue posed in the case of Bolling v. Sharpe.”). 
 8  See Supreme Court of the United States, School Segregation Cases—Order of 
Argument (July 9, 1954), http://www.archives.gov/global-pages 
/larger-image.html?i=/education/lessons/brown-case-order/images 
/arguments-l.jpg&c=/education/lessons/brown-case 
-order/images/arguments.caption.html (noting separate arguments and different 
counsel for Brown and Bolling).  
 9  Brown, 347 U.S. at 483 (stating the case was reargued December 8, 1953); 
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 497 (stating the case was reargued December 8–9, 1953). 
 10  347 U.S. at 498–99 (“The legal problem in the District of Columbia is 
somewhat different, however.  The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the 
District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the 
Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states.”).   
 11  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added). 
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gymnastics, the clause simply did not provide such constraints on the 
federal government.12  The Supreme Court recognized as much in 
Bolling,13 but ruled segregation illegal in the District of Columbia 
anyway.14 
The Bolling decision is now universally recognized as reaching an 
unquestionably correct result as a policy and moral matter.15  This 
recognition makes it all the harder for the adherents of originalism 
to defend their preferred approach to constitutional interpretation.  
Originalists are forced to concede that the Constitution, interpreted 
as originally understood, did not impose equal protection restraints 
on the federal government, and therefore Bolling, in imposing these 
norms where they were not meant to be, was wrongly decided.16  
Recognizing the political (and moral) problem with this approach, 
originalists have simply attempted to wave the problem away.  Justice 
Scalia, for instance, said that he is willing to “stipulate that you can 
reach some results you like with the other [non-originalist] system. 
But that’s not the test.”17  In other words, according to Justice Scalia, 
 
 12  See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) (“Unlike the 
Fourteenth Amendment the Fifth contains no equal protection clause and it 
provides no guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress.”). 
 13  347 U.S. at 498–99. 
 14  Id. at 500 (“In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states 
from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the 
same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government. We hold 
that racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of 
the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.”). 
 15  See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 83 (1990) (stating that a 
different result in Bolling “would be unthinkable, as a matter of morality and of 
politics.”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 33 (1980) (stating that author 
“would have strained sorely to side with the Chief Justice [Earl Warren],” but 
criticizing the decision’s rationale.); Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth 
Amendment: A Second American Revolution or the Logical Culmination of the Tradition, 25 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1159, 1162 n.14 (1992) (“As a matter of judicial statecraft, the 
imperative in Bolling was clear . . . .”); Michael J. Perry, Brown, Bolling, & 
Originalism: Why Ackerman and Posner (Among Others) Are Wrong, 20 S. ILL. U. L. J. 53, 73 
(1995) (“From the perspective of originalism, the Supreme Court made the right 
decision, it reached the correct result, in both Brown v. Board of Education and Bolling 
v. Sharpe.”); Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 977 (2004) 
(“[T]he dominant approach has been to regard Bolling and reverse incorporation as 
justified by the force of sheer normative necessity.”).  
 16  See BORK, supra note 15 at 83–84; Randy Barnett & Cass Sunstein, Constitution 
in Exile?, LEGAL AFF., (May 4, 2005, 12:50 PM), 
http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_cie0505.msp#Wednesday (“I do 
not have a fully worked-out opinion on this complex issue, but suppose that a 
commitment to originalism entails the reversal of Bolling.” (comment of Randy 
Barnett)).  But see Perry, supra note 15 (arguing that Bolling was correct in result, 
though incorrect in reasoning, from the originalist perspective).  
 17  Adam Liptak, From 19th-Century View, Desegregation Is a Test, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
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even if a faithful originalist approach results in permitting 
segregation, the approach itself remains sound.  The problem is that, 
at least in the popular perception, “[a] theory of constitutional 
interpretation that cannot account for Brown [and Bolling] is suspect 
if not discredited.”18 
Some scholars, Robert Bork and Randy Barnett among them, 
have argued that although Bolling is indefensible as an originalist 
matter, this is not a real problem.19  According to them, even if Bolling 
were overruled, no major problems would arise, simply because the 
federal government would be politically constrained from running 
segregated schools or otherwise discriminating on the basis of race.20  
This proposition is both dubious as a factual matter (or at the very 
least was so when Bolling was decided),21 and is unsatisfactory as a 
political matter.  While this approach may win adherents in the 
rarified intellectual circles of top law schools, the general public will 
be a much harder sell.  The general public is simply unlikely to buy 
into a judicial theory that would permit the federal government to 
discriminate at will on the basis of race. The judicial confirmation 
process has become increasingly politicized,22 and the general 
public’s opinions on the role of the judiciary matter.23  The public’s 
support is needed if a theory of constitutional interpretation is to 
 
2009, at A16 (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia’s remarks at a debate with Justice Steven 
G. Breyer.) 
 18  Id. 
 19  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 20  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 21  See infra notes 141–151 and accompanying text.  
 22  See, e.g., Emery G. Lee III, The Federalist in an Age of Faction: Rethinking 
Federalist No. 76 on the Senate’s Role in the Judicial Confirmations Process, 30 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 235, 266 (2004) (“The confirmations process for lower federal court judges 
has become increasingly politicized in recent years, and this trend will almost 
certainly continue given the importance of the federal judiciary in the political and 
policy battles of the two parties.”); Arthur H. Rotstein, Chief Justice Roberts Warns 
Against Politicized Confirmation Hearings, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 5, 2009, 5:56 AM ), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/05/chief-justice-roberts-
war_n_164299.html. 
 23  JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND 
CONFIRMATIONS 1 (2009) (“In the past, it was relatively rare for the mass public to 
play much of a role [in judicial confirmation battles].  Today, one of the crucial 
elements in confirmation strategies concerns how public opinion will be managed 
and manipulated.”); Stephen B. Presser, Judicial Ideology and the Survival of the Rule of 
Law: A Field Guide to the Current Political War over the Judiciary, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 
457 (2008) (“[S]haping public opinion and then persuading constituents to roar at 
their senators have become important elements of any judicial [confirmation] 
campaign.” (quoting T.R. Goldman, Lobby Groups Following Bork Playbook for Alito, 
LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 13, 2005, available at http://www.alm.law.com
/jsp/article.jsp?id=1134394504003&slreturn=20140304133013));  
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take hold not just at faculty workshops but in the courtrooms.  If 
originalism is to be broadly accepted by the public without being 
undermined by the discussion of Bolling and Brown, one needs to 
come up with a plausible explanation of how the results (if not the 
rationale) in those two cases can be supported under an originalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation.  This is the goal of this 
Article. 
In this Article I will argue that Bolling is justifiable as an 
originalist matter if one properly interprets the Citizenship Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Properly understood, the clause is 
meant to protect not just a right to a passport or nationality, but a 
much broader right of equal participation in the civic life of the 
Nation.  The term “citizen” was understood by the framers and 
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment to encompass a wide scope of 
political rights, including a right to equality before the law.  In Part II, 
I discuss the case itself and the Supreme Court’s rationale for 
concluding that the Constitution mandated the same result in Bolling 
as it did in Brown.  In Part III, I highlight the originalist criticism of 
Supreme Court’s logic and methodology and will discuss how 
committed originalists have dealt with the issue thus far.  In Part IV, I 
present my argument that the Bolling Court’s legal acrobatics were 
unnecessary and that a more sound approach would have been to 
rely on the Citizenship Clause.  I trace the history of that clause and 
the meaning of the word “citizen” as it was perceived by the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Part V is reserved for answering the 
objections to the argument presented in the preceding part.  I will 
offer concluding observations in Part VI. 
II. THE ROAD TO BOLLING AND THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONING 
A. The Legal Landscape 
Bolling and Brown were not the first cases where the Supreme 
Court has ruled against race-based classifications, and certainly not 
the first ones where it resolved the question one way or another.  One 
of the first cases in which race-based classification was challenged was 
Strauder v. West Virginia,24 heard merely twelve years after the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.25  Strauder, a black man, challenged 
 
 24  100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 25  The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed on June 13, 1866 and ratified on 
July 9, 1868.  THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS AMENDED, H.R. Doc. No. 110–50, 
at 17 (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin
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his murder conviction on the grounds that a West Virginia statute 
excluded non-whites from jury service.26  The Court sided with the 
petitioner holding that West Virginia’s statutory scheme deprived Mr. 
Strauder of “equal protection of the laws.”27  In 1886, the Court, in Yik 
Wo v. Hopkins,28 held that a state violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantees if it enforces a facially neutral law in a 
racially discriminatory manner.29  It was not until ten years later, a 
generation after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, that 
the Court handed down Plessy v. Ferguson30—where it held that a state 
may promulgate laws that require races to be segregated.  Even Plessy, 
however, was premised on the idea that the accommodations 
provided to each race would indeed be equal, though separate.31  The 
“separate but equal” doctrine was then extended to the field of public 
education in the 1899 case of Cumming v. Board of Education.32  This 
doctrine prevailed until Brown.33  Notably, all of the seminal cases 
 
/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_documents&docid=f:hd050.pdf.  Strauder was heard 
on October 21, 1879 and decided on March 1, 1880.  100 U.S. at 303. 
 26  Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304. 
 27  Id. at 310 (“[T]he statute of West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of 
jurors, as it does, against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws to a colored man when he is put upon trial for an 
alleged offence against the State . . . .”). 
 28  118 U.S. 356 (1886).  
 29  Id. at 373–74 (“Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in 
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye 
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations 
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal 
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.”).  
 30  163 U.S. 537 (1896).   
 31  Id. at 540 (“The first section of the statute enacts that all railway companies 
carrying passengers in their coaches in this state, shall provide equal but separate 
accommodations for the white, and colored races . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal 
quotations omitted)).  
 32  175 U.S. 528 (1899) (holding that uniform taxation for the purpose of 
maintaining segregated schools does not violate the Constitution).  Georgia’s 
Constitutional provision that was challenged in Cumming provided that there “be a 
thorough system of common schools for the education of children in the elementary 
branches of an English education only, as nearly uniform as practicable . . . .  [B]ut 
separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored races.”  Id. at 543 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 33  Although Brown was the first case that explicitly rejected the “separate but 
equal” doctrine, at least insofar as education was concerned, it was not, as often 
portrayed in the popular media, a bolt of lightning.  The foundation for Brown began 
almost twenty years prior when the Supreme Court required that though a state may 
segregate the races, it may not deny minorities equal opportunities albeit in separate 
facilities.  Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (“It was as an 
individual that he was entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and the State was 
bound to furnish him within its borders facilities for legal education substantially 
equal to those which the State there afforded for persons of the white race, whether 
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involved challenges to state rather than federal laws and practices.34  
The Court did not get an opportunity to address the constitutional 
limits on racial classification by the federal government head-on until 
World War II. At that time, several challenges were brought against 
United States Executive Order 9066, which directed all persons of 
Japanese ancestry (irrespective of citizenship) to report to 
internment camps.35  In the first case, Hirabayashi v. United States,36 
decided in 1943, the Court affirmed Mr. Hirabayashi’s conviction for 
violating a military imposed curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry 
and for disregarding the order to report to authorities “to register for 
evacuation from the military area.”37  Hirabayashi was a natural-born 
American citizen38 and contended that “Fourth, Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments [and] Article 4, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution 
defeat the indictment.”39  The Supreme Court disagreed by first 
noting that “[t]he Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection 
clause and it restrains only such discriminatory legislation by 
 
or not other negroes sought the same opportunity.”).  In 1950, the Court ruled that 
on the facts before them that the educational opportunities in the segregated 
facilities for graduate studies were not in fact equal and ordered the admission of 
black students to the white-only state graduate schools.  McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (“We conclude that the conditions 
under which this appellant is required to receive his education deprive him of his 
personal and present right to the equal protection of the laws. . . . Appellant, having 
been admitted to a state-supported graduate school, must receive the same treatment 
at the hands of the state as students of other races.”); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 
635 (1950) (“[P]etitioner may claim his full constitutional right: legal education 
equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other races.  Such education is 
not available to him in a separate law school as offered by the State.”).  
 34  The one notable exception was the 1898 case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 
169 U.S. 649 (1898).  There, a person born in the United States to Chinese 
immigrants challenged the decision of the San Francisco Collector of Customs to 
deny him readmission to the United States on the grounds that the Chinese 
Exclusion Act barred his entry.  Id. at 649–50.  The Court ultimately ruled for Wong, 
not because the Chinese Exclusion Act was contrary to any provision of the 
Constitution, but because Wong was born in the United States he was a citizen 
thereof, and thus not subject to the Act’s strictures.  Id. at  704–05 (“The fact . . . that 
acts of Congress or treaties have not permitted Chinese persons born out of this 
country to become citizens by naturalization, cannot exclude Chinese persons born 
in this country from the operation of the broad and clear words of the constitution: 
‘All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States.’ . . .  [A] child born in the United States  . . . becomes at 
the time of his birth a citizen of the United States.”).  
 35  Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942), available at 
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=74&page=transcript. 
 36  320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 37  Id. at 84–85. 
 38  United States v. Hirabayashi, 46 F. Supp. 657, 658 (W.D. Wash. 1942). 
 39  Id. at 661. 
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Congress as amounts to a denial of due process . . . .”40  At the same 
time, the Court declared that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality.”41  The two sentences, appearing next to each other, are 
somewhat incongruent.  The first seems to permit the federal 
government to discriminate on any basis so long as it has a legitimate 
reason for doing so.  The second sentence implies an almost 
categorical ban on such classifications (absent some very 
extraordinary circumstances).  The Court, however, blithely ignored 
the tension between these two pronouncements and concluded that 
given the emergency and extraordinary circumstances of the war with 
Japan, the curfew and registration orders were proper.42 
The Court followed up on Hirabayashi the next year when it 
decided a more famous case, Korematsu v. United States.43  The facts 
were similar to Hirabayashi except that Fred Korematsu defied the 
evacuation order and not the curfew and registration orders.44  Once 
again, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.45  This time, 
though, the justices utilized rather novel language in their opinion.  
It opened with the admonition that “all legal restrictions which 
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately 
suspect . . . It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid 
scrutiny.”46  No citations for this novel proposition (at least insofar as 
applied to the federal government) were offered.  The Court opined 
that “[c]ompulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their 
homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is 
inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions,”47 but upheld 
the order nonetheless reasoning that “when under conditions of 
modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the 
power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened 
 
 40  Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. at 101 (“The adoption by Government, in the crisis of war and of 
threatened invasion, of measures for the public safety, based upon the recognition of 
facts and circumstances which indicate that a group of one national extraction may 
menace that safety more than others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the 
Constitution and is not to be condemned merely because in other and in most 
circumstances racial distinctions are irrelevant.”). 
 43  323 U.S. 214 (1944).  
 44  Id. at 215–16.  
 45  Id. at 223–24.  
 46  Id. at 216.  
 47  Id. at 219–20.  
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danger.”48  Although the Court opened by emphasizing the 
impermissibility of racial distinctions absent some compelling reason, 
it closed by stating that excluding any “large groups of citizens from 
their homes,” whether the exclusion is based on race or not, is highly 
suspect.49  In other words, the Court’s ultimate reasoning had little to 
do with race, and instead was grounded in the proposition that the 
government simply cannot act arbitrarily and irrationally with respect 
to any group of people. 
Justice Murphy, in dissent, offered an even more novel idea.  He 
contended that “[b]eing an obvious racial discrimination, the order 
deprives all those within its scope of the equal protection of the laws 
as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.”50  He offered no citation for the 
proposition that the Fifth Amendment guarantees equal protection 
of the laws.  Indeed, in Hirabayashi, he wrote in a concurring opinion 
that “the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, contains no 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.”51  No explanation was given for 
this change in views. 
The doctrine was thus fairly muddled.  On one hand, States were 
allowed to segregate the races provided that the segregated facilities 
were indeed equal (though the latter requirement was honored only 
in breach).52  On the other hand, the federal government was told 
that it was not bound by the equal protection strictures,53 while at the 
same time was being warned that any racial classifications were “by 
their very nature odious to a free people,”54 and would be “subject . . . 
to the most rigid scrutiny.”55  It is against this muddled legal 
background that Bolling was argued. 
B. The Court’s Opinion 
The Court issued a terse six paragraph opinion that avoided any 
discussion of the facts, save for the observation that “petitioners, 
 
 48  Id. at 220.  
 49  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219–20 (“Compulsory exclusion of large groups of 
citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and 
peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions.”).  Note the absence of 
any reference to race.  See also id. at 223 (“Korematsu was not excluded from the 
Military Area because of hostility to him or his race.”).  
 50  Id. at 234–35 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 51  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 112 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added).  
 52  See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.  
 53  See supra notes 12 & 51. 
 54  Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100. 
 55  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 215, 216 (1944).  
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minors of the Negro race . . . . were refused admission to a public 
school attended by white children solely because of their race.”56  The 
reasoning was similarly brief.  First, the Court recognized that “[t]he 
Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, 
does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth 
Amendment which applies only to the states.”57  Nonetheless, the 
Court concluded that “the concepts of equal protection and due 
process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not 
mutually exclusive,”58 meaning that the two phrases may each 
independently proscribe the same conduct.  The Court was quick to 
disavow the notion that the phrases are “always interchangeable,” on 
the grounds that “[t]he ‘equal protection of the laws’ is a more 
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than ‘due process of 
law’ . . . .”59  Nonetheless, the Bolling Court concluded its decision 
with the observation that “[i]n view of our decision that the 
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated 
public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution 
would impose a lesser duty on the federal government.”60  Needless to 
say, the two phrases are highly inconsistent.  If “[t]he ‘equal 
protection of the laws’ is a more explicit [and therefore presumably 
more exacting] safeguard of prohibited unfairness than ‘due process 
of law,’”61 then it should follow that the Constitution does in fact 
impose a greater burden on those entities (i.e., the states) to which 
the Equal Protection Clause applies, and a lesser burden on those 
entities (i.e., the federal government) to which the clause does not 
apply.62  This contradiction did not seem to particularly bother the 
Court. 
To be fair to the Court, politically there was no other option but 
to reach the decision the Court did in Bolling.63  As it was, the Court’s 
bombshell opinion in Brown was greeted with derision and resistance 
in the Southern states.64  One could only imagine the reaction if the 
 
 56  Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498. 
 57  Id. at 499. 
 58  Id.  
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. at 500. 
 61  Id. at 499. 
 62  In other words, if the duties are identical, then the guarantees of the Equal 
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause must also be identical—contrary to 
the Court’s assertion. 
 63  See McConnell, supra note 15 at 1162 n.14 (“As a matter of judicial statecraft, 
the imperative in Bolling was clear . . . .”). 
 64  See, e.g., BORK, supra note 15 at 77 (“Those of us of a certain age remember the 
intense, indeed hysterical, opposition that Brown aroused in parts of the South.”); J. 
DOLIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2014  12:16 PM 
2014] RESOLVING THE ORIGINAL SIN 759 
Court had imposed what was viewed by the Southern politicians at 
the time as an odious requirement on their states65 but freed the 
federal government from adhering to the same norms.  However, the 
political realities should not obscure the Court’s abdication of any 
intellectual effort to ground the decision in the actual text or history 
of the Constitution.  One could attempt to justify Bolling by reference 
to one of its more unsung lines that “segregation in public education 
is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and 
thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a 
burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in 
violation of the Due Process Clause.”66  Seemingly, this line expresses 
a rather uncontroversial idea (either then or now) that the 
government (state or federal) is prohibited from behaving in an 
arbitrary and capricious fashion.  The idea of striking down 
government regulations that could not be justified as “reasonably 
related to any proper governmental objective”—the rational basis 
review—dates at least to 1938 and the Court’s decision in United States 
v. Carolene Products Co.,67 and perhaps as far back as the 1819 case of 
McCulloch v. Maryland.68  If the Bolling Court were simply saying that 
racial segregation is not rational governance, the decision would still 
have been quite noteworthy and groundbreaking (after all, the D.C. 
public schools had been segregated for over 100 years by the time 
Bolling was decided),69 but at the very least the opinion would not 
have strayed far from either precedent or the text and understanding 
of the Constitution. 
There are two problems with viewing Bolling in the manner just 
 
HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION: 1954–1978 61–127 (1979) (discussing the “massive resistance” to 
Brown); Michael J. Klarman, Brown at 50, 90 VA. L. REV. 1613, 1625 (2004) (noting 
that Southern politicians’ “response to Brown involved a resort to extremism and 
highly inflammatory language”).  
 65  See 102 Cong. Rec. 4459–61 (1956). 
 66  Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.   
 67  304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[N]o pronouncement of a legislature can forestall 
attack upon the constitutionality of the prohibition which it enacts by applying 
opprobrious epithets to the prohibited act, and that a statute would deny due process 
which precluded the disproof in judicial proceedings of all facts which would show or 
tend to show that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty, or property had a 
rational basis.”).   
 68  17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope 
of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted 
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.”).   
 69  See infra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that the first statute 
providing for schools for colored children was passed in 1862).  
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described.  First, it is inconsistent with the rest of the opinion.  In the 
paragraph immediately preceding the allusion to rational basis 
review, the Court stated that “[c]lassifications based solely upon race 
must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to 
our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.”70  The reference to 
“particular care,” with the citation to Korematsu v. United States, is an 
invocation of strict scrutiny and not of rational basis review.71  Second, 
this is simply not how Bolling came to be viewed, neither by the 
justices who handed down the original decision nor by their 
successors.  Rather, Bolling was, and still is, viewed as standing for the 
proposition that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
requires the same level of scrutiny for any federal race-based 
classifications as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment for state race-based classifications.72  In other words, 
Bolling came to mean that the Fifth Amendment has, its actual text 
notwithstanding, an equal protection component.73  Indeed, the 
Solicitor General, representing the United States as amicus curiae in 
Bolling, did not dispute this proposition.74  And so, an atextual and 
ahistoric approach carried the day and opened the door for scathing 
criticism of the opinion as doctrinally unsound, even if morally, 
politically, and policy-wise correct.75 
III. THE ORIGINALIST CRITIQUE AND INITIAL RESPONSE 
There are two general types of critique leveled at Bolling.  The 
first one (hereinafter the “broad critique”) essentially argues that as 
 
 70  Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499. The Court’s assertion that “classifications based solely 
upon race . . . are contrary to our traditions,” was also dubious as a factual matter.  Id. 
After all, D.C. public schools had been segregated for over 100 years, and the Court 
itself gave its imprimatur to racial segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson.  That is not to say 
that these traditions were in any way morally or legally just or justifiable.  However, to 
suggest that segregation was contrary to American traditions as they existed in 1954 is 
to deny (the very sordid) history.   
 71  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (holding that racial 
classifications are subject “to the most rigid scrutiny,” and not mere rational basis 
review).  
 72  See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 73  See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 74  See Peter J. Rubin, Taking its Proper Place in the Constitutional Canon: Bolling v. 
Sharpe, Korematsu, and the Equal Protection Component of Fifth Amendment Due Process, 
92 VA. L. REV. 1879, 1894–95 (2006) (describing the amicus brief of the United States 
and stating that “the federal government did not argue that the Equal Protection 
Clause was inapplicable to federal governmental action or that the measure of 
constitutionality under the Due Process Clause differed from that under the Equal 
Protection Clause”).  
 75  See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. 
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an originalist matter, school desegregation decisions (both Brown and 
Bolling) were wrong.76  The second one argues that while Brown can 
be justified on originalist grounds, Bolling cannot.77  I will discuss the 
basic premise of the two critiques below, but will primarily focus on 
the latter for two reasons.  First, others have engaged the broader 
critique, and second, the goal of the present Article is not to argue 
the relative merits of school desegregation cases (from the originalist 
perspective)  but to present the argument that the Constitution, as 
originally understood, prohibits the federal government from 
discrimination on the basis of race.  The reason I focus on the Bolling 
case is not because it decided the then-controversial issue of school 
segregation, but rather because it was the first case that explicitly held 
that though the Equal Protection Clause is textually inapplicable to 
the federal government, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment imposes identical requirements.  With these caveats, I 
now turn to the originalist critique of Bolling. 
A. The Broad Critique of Desegregation Cases 
The basic premise of the broad critique is fairly simple.  The 
argument centers on the fact that the Congress that enacted the 
Fourteenth Amendment intended to keep schools segregated, and 
therefore, did not intend for “equal protection of the laws” to mean 
racial integration.  Several facts are cited for this proposition.  One of 
the most often cited is the fact that the Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee made the following statement in his defense of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866: 
What do [the] terms [“civil rights and immunities”] mean? 
Do they mean that in all things civil, social, political, all 
citizens, without distinction of race or color, shall be equal?  
By no means can they be so construed . . . . Nor do they 
mean that all citizens shall sit on the juries, or that their 
children shall attend the same schools.78 
Additionally, Representative Bingham, a chief proponent of the 
 
 76  See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1915 (1995) (arguing that 
originalism is inconsistent with the result in Brown); Earl M. Maltz, A Dissenting 
Opinion to Brown, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 93, 93 (1995) (arguing that Brown conflicts with 
the original understanding and is therefore wrongly decided); see also LEARNED HAND, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES, 1958 55 (1958) (“I have 
never been able to understand on what basis [Brown] does or can rest except as a 
coup de main.”). 
 77  See BORK, supra note 15, at 83–84; ELY, supra note 15, at 32–33. 
 78  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson). 
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Civil Rights Act, actually fought for the deletion of the legislative 
language that required “no discrimination.”79  The fact that Congress 
permitted segregation in D.C. schools since 1862,80 that is, since 
before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and did not 
believe it necessary to withdraw its approval for this arrangement 
post-1868, is also cited as proof that Congress did not view the Equal 
Protection Clause to require racial integration.81  The prevalence of 
racial segregation in state schools (in both Northern and Southern 
states) is pointed to as additional evidence that segregation is fully 
consistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.82  All of these considerations led Alexander Bickel, then 
a law clerk to Justice Frankfurter, to state in a memorandum to the 
Justice, “it is impossible to conclude that the 39th Congress intended 
that segregation be abolished; impossible also to conclude that they 
foresaw it might be, under the language they were adopting.”83 
With this seemingly impressive array of evidence, it is easy to 
argue that originalism cannot be a pathway to judicially imposed 
racial desegregation, and that therefore it is not an acceptable 
interpretive methodology.84  Yet, at closer look, the history is not all 
that one-sided,85 nor is it ultimately determinative of the original 
 
 79  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 1290–91 (1866). 
 80  See ch. 83, 12 Stat. 407 (1862) (providing for schools for colored children). 
 81  For an overview of history of Congressional legislation dealing with D.C. 
public schools see Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1950).  But see Michael W. 
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 977–80 
(1995) (arguing that Congress did not affirmatively create or support segregation in 
the District of Columbia, other than appropriating money for already-established 
segregated schools, and that little can be gleaned from such practice).  
 82  McConnell, supra note 81, at 955–56. 
 83  RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 657 (2004); see also Alexander M. 
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1955). 
 84  To be sure, some proponents of originalism accept the proposition that Brown 
was wrongly decided as an originalist matter, and are willing to live with that result 
on the grounds that it is “the price we pay for having a constitution with determinate 
meaning that may not always coincide with our moral convictions . . . .”  Michael W. 
McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 457, 457 (1996); see also RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 117–33, 241–45 (1977) (arguing 
that original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit school 
segregation); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1385, 1463 n.295 (1992) (“I do not think that my theory of the 14th Amendment 
stands or falls with this question.  Man is not the measure of all things, as Socrates 
replied to the Sophists, and neither is [Brown].  An interpretation of the Constitution 
is not wrong because it would produce a different result in Brown.”). 
 85  See generally McConnell, supra note 81. 
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meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
There are statements from the sponsors of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866,86 the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (the “1875 Act”),87 the Freedman’s 
Bureau Acts,88 and of course, the Fourteenth Amendment itself that 
paint a quite different picture of what the meaning the words of the 
Amendment had for its contemporaries.  For instance, Representative 
Henry Raymond of New York stated that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“secures an equality of rights among all the citizens of the United 
States . . . .”89  Representative William Windom of Minnesota stated in 
support of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that it provides for “the absolute 
equality of rights of the whole people, high and low, rich and poor, 
white and black.”90  Senator Lyman Trumbull argued, in support of 
the same Act that it “declares that all persons in the United States 
shall be entitled to the same civil rights.”91  Senator Henry Smith Lane 
of Indiana spoke in favor of the 1866 Act and contended that the 
newly freed slaves are now “entitled to all the privileges and 
immunities of other free citizens of the United States.”92  Though 
these speakers did not explicitly state that equality extended to 
 
 86  Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 
(2011)). 
 87  Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).  While it is true that the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
postdated the Fourteenth Amendment, and was passed by a different Congress, the 
43rd Congress would seem to have been more, not less, hostile to equal rights for 
blacks.  The 39th Congress had 39 Republican Senators (out of 54 total) and 136 
Republican Representatives (out of 193 total).  In contrast, the 43rd Congress had 47 
Republican Senators (out of 74 total) and 199 Republican Representatives (out of 
292 total).  While in both Congresses Republicans maintained overwhelming 
majorities, in terms of percentage of their seats, their numbers slipped by the time 
the 43rd Congress was seated.  Furthermore, the elections of 1874, which occurred 
several months before the lame-duck 43rd Congress passed the Act, “were a disaster 
for the Republican Party, which lost eighty-nine seats in the House.”  McConnell, 
supra note 81, at 1080. 
 88  Ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865); ch. 200, 14 Stat. 176 (1866).  Other legislative 
enactments that sought to secure civil rights for the newly emancipated blacks 
included the Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867), the 
Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870), and the Enforcement Act of 
1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871). 
 89  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2502 (1866).  Raymond “favored the policy 
of the Civil Rights Bill because he ‘was in favor of securing an equality of rights to all 
citizens of the United States,’ but voted to sustain the President’s veto, because he 
doubted Congress’ power to pass it.  Raymond ‘very cheerfully’ supported the 14th 
Amendment because it would resolve those doubts.”  Harrison, supra note 84, at 1412 
n.98 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2502 (1866)).  
 90  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866) (emphasis added).  
 91  Id. at 599 (emphasis added).  Note that the Senator did not merely state that 
the rights are to be equal, but same. 
 92  Id. at 602 (emphasis added).   
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schools—and may, for all we know, been privately of the view that this 
promise of equality did not cover education institutions—, their 
statements indicate the original public meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s language. 
The supporters of the 1875 Act were even more explicit in what 
they expected the Act to accomplish.  First the Act itself spoke of the 
need to “recognize the equality of all men before the law,”93 and 
accordingly directed that “all persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public 
conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public 
amusement . . . .”94  As Michael McConnell shows, many of the 
proponents of the 1875 Act were explicitly in favor of school 
desegregation, quite often for precisely the same reasons that Chief 
Justice Warren advanced in Brown.95  For instance, Senator Frederick 
Frelinghuysen (quite presciently) argued that “‘schools [for the 
colored children] will be inferior to those for the whites’ because the 
whites are politically dominant and will favor their own.”96  Senator 
George “Edmunds presented extensive evidence of the actual 
inequality of the schools . . . .”97  Representative Thomas Williams 
contended that segregation “teach[es] our little boys that they are too 
good to sit with these men’s children in the public school-room, 
thereby nurturing a prejudice they never knew, and preparing these 
classes for mutual hatred hereafter . . . .”98  Senator Charles Sumner, 
the chief architect of what would become the 1875 Act, retorted to 
the claim that separate can be equal: “Now let me ask the Senator 
whether in this world the personal respect that one receives is not an 
element of comfort? If a person is treated with indignity, can he be 
 
 93  Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
 94  Id. at 336. 
 95  Compare McConnell, supra note 81, at 1012–13 (“Proponents of the bill denied 
that segregated facilities were or could be equal, in light of the message of inferiority 
conveyed by the arrangement.”) and McConnell, supra note 84, at 462 (“Sumner [the 
sponsor of what would become the Civil Rights Act of 1875] called segregation an 
‘indignity, an insult, and a wrong.’  There were endless speeches by supporters of the 
Act—not confined to radical Republicans—declaring that the only argument for 
segregation was ‘prejudice,’ and that segregation was ‘caste’ legislation.”) (footnotes 
omitted) with Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (“To separate them from others of similar age 
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to 
their status in the community  . . .”).  
 96  McConnell, supra note 81, at 1013 (quoting 2 CONG. REC. 3452 (1874)). 
 97  Id. at 1013. 
 98  3 CONG. REC. 1002 (1875). 
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comfortable?”99 
The debate on the Fourteenth Amendment itself is not 
particularly illuminating, perhaps in part because the Amendment 
was viewed as simply constitutionalizing the 1866 Civil Rights Act.100  
For this reason, those who argue that the framers of the Amendment 
did not intend to abolish segregation point to the statements made 
ostensibly in defense of the 1866 Act that foreswear any such 
outcome.101  Aside from the inconsistency of the statements between 
various proponents, there is another problem with this approach.  
Specifically, Congressman Wilson, who was the Chair of the House 
Judiciary Committee and a chief sponsor of the 1866 Act, and whose 
words102 are often pointed to as proof that neither the Act nor, by 
 
 99  CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 243 (1872).  Frelinghuysen echoed this 
statement, calling segregation “‘an enactment of personal degradation and a form of 
‘legalized disability or inferiority . . . .’”). McConnell, supra note 81, at 1013 (quoting 
2 CONG. REC. 3452 (1874)). 
 100  Donald E. Lively, Equal Protection and Moral Circumstance: Accounting for 
Constitutional Basics, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 485, 495–96 (1991) (“Because the 
fourteenth amendment was intended to constitutionalize the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 
analyzing the aims and focus of the statute substantially reveals the original 
understanding of the amendment.”) (footnote omitted); McConnell, supra note 81, 
at 960 (“[T]he principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
constitutionalize the 1866 Act, and speakers on both sides often spoke as if the 
substance of the two measures were identical.”). Note that McConnell points out that 
“speakers on both sides” viewed the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
1866 Civil Rights Act as identical.  Id. (emphasis added).  This suggests that not only 
was it the original intent of the Amendment’s framers to constitutionalize the Act, 
but that that was the public understanding of the Amendment’s purpose and scope. 
 101  See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin’s The Moral Reading of the Constitution: A 
Critique, 72 IND. L.J. 1099, 1102–03 (1997) (“[T]here is the assurance by James 
Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, that the Civil Rights Bill of 
1866, which was inextricably linked with the Fourteenth Amendment, did not 
require that all children shall attend the same schools.”) (footnotes omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 951 (1998) (“There was a widespread 
understanding that Section 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] simply 
constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the legislative history of that Act 
suggests fairly clearly that Congress understood it to permit segregation.”); Kevin F. 
Ryan, Remembering and Forgetting Brown, 30 VT. B.J. 5, 8 (“Indeed, the sponsors of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which the fourteenth amendment was intended to 
constitutionalize, specifically disclaimed any intent to interfere with segregated 
education.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Black On Brown, 90 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658 (2004) 
(“The Fourteenth Amendment was meant to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, and the sponsors of that Act specifically disclaimed any intention to interfere 
with segregated education.”). 
 102  Representative Wilson claimed that the Act did not mean that black children 
“shall attend the same schools” as white children.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1117 (1866). 
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implication, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited segregation,103 
also opined that exclusion from jury service on account of race would 
not run afoul of the legislation (and again, by implication, of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).104  But as I discussed supra, such a view was 
soundly rejected by the Supreme Court in Strauder.  The Strauder 
Court was only a dozen years removed from the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and thus was quite familiar with the climate 
surrounding its adoption.  It held that: 
This is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a 
common purpose; namely, securing to a race recently 
emancipated, a race that through many generations had 
been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior 
race enjoy . . . . At the time when they were incorporated 
into the Constitution, it required little knowledge of human 
nature to anticipate that those who had long been regarded 
as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly raised 
to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and 
positive dislike, and that State laws might be enacted or 
enforced to perpetuate the distinctions that had before 
existed.  Discriminations against them had been habitual.  It 
was well known that in some States laws making such 
discriminations then existed, and others might well be 
expected . . . . The existence of laws in the States where the newly 
emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross 
injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be 
remedied, and by [the Fourteenth Amendment] such laws 
were forbidden. . . . 
 
If this is the spirit and meaning of the amendment, whether 
it means more or not, it is to be construed liberally, to carry 
out the purposes of its framers . . . . What is this but 
declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the 
black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or 
white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in 
regard to the colored race, for whose protection the 
amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination 
shall be made against them by law because of their color?  
The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but 
 
 103  See Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove’s Rendition of Original Meaning, 72 IND. L.J. 619, 
633 (1997) (“A Congress which refused to abolish segregation in the District of 
Columbia was altogether unlikely to compel the States to outlaw it.  That was 
confirmed by the assurance of James Wilson that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not 
require that all children ‘shall attend the same schools.’”); Berger, supra note 101, at 
1102–03. 
 104  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866). 
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they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or 
right, most valuable to the  colored race,—the right to 
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them 
distinctively as colored,—exemption from legal discriminations, 
implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of 
their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and 
discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to 
the condition of a subject race.105 
This passage from Strauder undermines Chairman Wilson’s claim 
on both the specific point about the jury service, and on the broader 
point that the Amendment was not meant to prohibit legislation that 
imposed special hardships on blacks as a class.  And if Congressman 
Wilson was wrong about the jury service implication of the 
Amendment, his musings on the Amendment’s effect on segregated 
schooling should, at the very least, be suspect. 
In short, the views of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers vis-à-
vis school segregation were far from uniform.  Indeed, even John W. 
Davis, arguing (on behalf of South Carolina) in the companion case 
to Brown (and having every reason to stress 39th Congress’ hostility to 
integration) told the Supreme Court that “perhaps there has never 
been a Congress in which the debates furnished less real pablum on 
which history might feed.”106  Given this contradictory history, the 
argument that the outcome in Brown cannot be squared with the 
original understanding of the Constitution is not nearly as forceful as 
it is often portrayed. 
Ultimately, I do not intend to make my stand on the specific 
views of particular legislators.  The individual views of the legislators 
cannot and do not change the public meaning of the words that were 
enacted into law.  Even if the sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the 1866 Act privately hoped to maintain all-white schools, it 
does not follow that the meaning of “citizenship” at the time of the 
Clause’s enactment permitted such an arrangement. 
Two additional observations should be made prior to 
proceeding to the next Part.  First, the adherents to the broad 
critique of the desegregation cases, in addition to citing various 
statements in the Congressional record, point to the segregation in 
D.C. public schools as an almost incontrovertible proof that the 
 
 105  Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306–08 (1879) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106 Argument of John W. Davis, Esq., on behalf of Appellees R.W. Elliott et al., 
Brown v. Board of Education, in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 481 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
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framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not mean to outlaw the 
practice.  The critics argue that the people who crafted the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not view segregation as unconstitutional 
because the framers of the Amendment also provided for segregated 
schools.107  However, there is less to this historical practice than meets 
the eye.  The mere fact that segregation was practiced does not 
necessarily mean that it was consistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment even as originally understood.  It would not have been 
the first time in the history of the Republic that the framers of a very 
liberal (and remedial) Constitutional provision themselves behaved 
in very illiberal ways.  Consider the Alien and Sedition Acts,108 passed 
by the Fifth Congress and signed into law by John Adams.109  The Acts 
were approved by many of the same congressmen that enacted the 
First Amendment.110  Nonetheless, this fact did not save the Acts from 
being viewed as unconstitutional from the moment of enactment111 to 
 
 107  See, e.g., Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (“[T]he fact that . . . 
Congress . . . enacted legislation which specifically provided for separation of the 
races in the schools of the District of Columbia, conclusively support our view” that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit segregation); Steven B. Epstein, 
Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2155 n.433 
(1996) (“It is noteworthy that one week after Congress enacted the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it adopted legislation providing for segregated schools in the District of 
Columbia.  If the Supreme Court had applied in Brown the same sort of rigid 
originalist inquiry it later applied in Marsh, segregated schools could still be a staple 
of American life.”) (citation omitted); Anthony Lewis, Why the Courts, 22 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 133, 136 (2000) (“When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, 
schools were segregated in the District of Columbia, a federal enclave under the 
jurisdiction of Congress. . . .  So it is impossible to say that the Framers of the Equal 
Protection Clause intended it to outlaw segregation.”). 
 108  Chs. 58, 66, 74, 1 Stat. 570, 577, 596 (1798). 
 109  Arthur R. Landever, Suppressed History or Distorted History? A Review of Rosenfeld’s 
The American Aurora, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 259, 260 (1997) (noting that Adams 
signed and enforced the Acts). 
 110  See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 493 
(1983) (“[T]he same generation that wrote the first amendment also wrote the Alien 
and Sedition Acts of 1798.”); Kenneth D. Katkin, The Second Amendment Today 
Historical & Contemporary Perspectives on the Constitutionality of Firearms Regulation, 29 N. 
KY. L. REV. 643, 646 (2002) (“[J]ust seven years after drafting the First Amendment, 
the same generation of lawmakers also enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts, which 
made it a federal felony to criticize government policy.”).   
 111  Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1529, 1591 (2000) (“Thomas Jefferson, who believed that the Alien and Sedition 
Acts were unconstitutional, not only refused to enforce the laws but pardoned those 
already convicted under their authority.”); Michael Scaperlanda, Who is My Neighbor?: 
An Essay on Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the Constitution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1587, 
1602 (1997) (“Kentucky and Virginia, Jefferson and Madison viewed the Alien & 
Sedition Acts as unconstitutional on numerous grounds.”).  
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the present day.112  The fact that the people who wrote a given law 
engaged in, or condoned some behavior, does not ipso facto mean 
that the behavior was at any time legal.113 
Lastly, in many ways the practice of segregation in the 1860s is 
not all that informative for those who had to judge the legality of that 
practice ninety years later.  When the Reconstruction Congress first 
addressed the issue of public education for blacks in the District of 
Columbia it passed a rather curious statute.114  Section 1 of the statute 
required the municipal authorities of the District to appropriate 
funds “for the purpose of initiating a system of primary schools for 
the education of colored children . . . .”115  Read in isolation, this 
section suggests that Congress meant to establish segregated schools 
because it did not wish for black children to mix with white children.  
Yet, Section 4 of the very same statute reads: 
[A]ll persons of color in the District of Columbia, or in the 
corporate limits of the cities of Washington and 
Georgetown, shall be subject and amenable to the same 
laws and ordinances to which free white persons are or may 
be subject or amenable; that they shall be tried for any 
offences against the laws in the same manner as free white 
persons are or may be tried for the same offences; and that 
upon being legally convicted of any crime or offence 
against any law or ordinance, such persons of color shall be 
liable to the same penalty or punishment, and no other, as 
would be imposed or inflicted upon free white persons for 
the same crime or offence; and all acts or parts of acts 
inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby 
repealed.116 
Reading this section, it becomes clear that Congress indeed 
intended to provide equal legal treatment for all people irrespective 
of skin color.  How, then, can such two contradictory sections be 
reconciled?  As it turns out there is not much mystery.  The 
Reconstruction Congress was concerned with providing opportunities 
for blacks where such opportunities had been previously denied 
 
 112  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 626 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(“Ten years after proposing the First Amendment, Congress passed the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, measures patently unconstitutional by modern standards.”). 
 113  I do not mean to say that historical practice should be accorded no weight in 
determining what was understood by legislative enactments contemporaneous with 
the practice in question.  What I do argue is that the mere existence of the practice is 
not determinative.   
 114 The Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976). 
 115  Id. at § 1. 
 116  Id. at § 4.  
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them.  To that end, Congress passed bills that provided economic 
and educational opportunities exclusively to blacks.117  The goal was 
not to discriminate against blacks, but to provide them with 
opportunities to become citizens on equal footing with the “free 
white persons.”  This necessitated special schools in the District.  In 
other words, the “system of primary schools for the education of 
colored children” only was not created out of malice, but out of 
desire to help improve the lot of freedmen while recognizing that at 
the time they simply were not prepared (due to the recent and long-
standing oppression of slavery) to compete in schooling or economic 
life on a nominally even playing field.118 
However, the reasons for segregation markedly changed with the 
enactment of the ever more oppressive Jim Crow laws.  By 1950s, 
segregation was “discrimination[] implying inferiority in civil society, 
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others 
enjoy, and . . . reducing [blacks] to the condition of a subject race.”119  
In other words, by the 1950s, segregation was precisely the type of 
activity prohibited by the Court’s decision in Strauder, and a type of 
activity that that Court viewed as inconsistent with the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is important to 
point out that this observation is not a defense of Brown on the basis 
of something like the “evolving standards of decency” standard used 
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,120 for such a defense is not 
originalist at all.121  Rather, it is an argument that to the extent that 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment approved of segregation, 
they did so in large parts on the grounds that it was benign and 
perhaps beneficial differentiation based on the recognition that the 
recently freed slaves needed a separate set of measures in order to 
 
 117  See generally Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754–83 (describing special assistance 
Congress provided to freed blacks).  Indeed, the Freedmen Bureau’s education 
programs often excluded white children by design.  While the Freedmen Bureau Act 
provided for educational opportunities for blacks, “[t]he legislation before 
Congress . . . made no provision for educating white children, other than refugees, 
even on an integrated basis.”  Id. at 766.  
 118  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 631–32 (1866) (statement of 
Rep. Moulton) (“The very object of the bill is to break down the discrimination 
between whites and blacks. . . .  Therefore I repeat that the true object of this bill is 
the amelioration of the condition of the colored people.”). 
 119  Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879). 
 120  See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).   
 121  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607–08 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(contrasting original understanding with “evolving standards of decency”).  
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ultimately integrate them into the fabric of American civic life.122  
When segregation became malignant discrimination, it fell within the 
zone proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.123 
There have been other originalist theories advanced in defense 
of Brown from the broad critique.  In The Tempting of America, Robert 
Bork opined that Brown is not problematic from the originalist 
perspective because it freed the courts from an endless factual 
inquiry of whether a given separate school for blacks was truly “equal” 
to a school for whites.124  In other words, according to Bork, while 
segregation is constitutionally permissible in theory, it is only 
permissible if the facilities are indeed equal.125  The problem from 
Bork’s perspective is that in practice the facilities were never equal, 
and that the fact-intensive inquiries into the matter uniformly led to 
the same result.126  Therefore, Bork argues, it was reasonable for the 
Court to promulgate a blanket rule rather than engage in ultimately 
pointless factual inquiries.127  Alternatively, Justice Scalia (when he is 
 
 122  While this may have been patronizing and quite possibly racist attitude it is 
quite different from discriminatory laws “implying inferiority in civil society,” which is 
what Jim Crow laws were.  For further discussion see infra notes 252–254 and 
accompanying text. 
 123  This argument is consistent with the originalist views on affirmative action.  
Though most originalists reject the practice as inconsistent with the Constitution, see, 
e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346–95 (2003) (dissents by Rehnquist, C.J., 
Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.), even they find it permissible if it is meant to remedy past 
discrimination.  See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 582 (2009) (“[C]ertain 
government actions to remedy past racial discrimination—actions that are 
themselves based on race—are constitutional. . . .”); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (“[O]ur prior cases, in evaluating 
the use of racial classifications in the school context, have recognized two interests 
that qualify as compelling. The first is the compelling interest of remedying the 
effects of past intentional discrimination.”).  The majority decisions in Ricci and 
Parents Involved were joined by Justices Thomas and Scalia—both of whom dissented 
in part in Grutter—and who are the leading judicial proponents of originalism.  Ricci, 
557 U.S. at 594, 596; Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 708; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346, 349.   
 124  See BORK, supra note 15, at 82–83.  
 125  See BORK, supra note 15, at 82. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Id.  In some ways this is similar to a per se rule in antitrust analysis.  See State 
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“Some types of restraints, however, have such 
predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for 
procompetitive benefit, that they are deemed unlawful per se.  Per se treatment is 
appropriate once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to 
predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.”) (internal citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, the Court had enough 
experience with segregated schools to “to predict with confidence” that fact-intensive 
analysis would condemn them.  Id.  It was so because segregated schools had 
“predictable and pernicious . . . effect[s]” and therefore had to be held “unlawful per 
se.”  Id. 
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not dismissing Brown with a “so what”128) suggests that it is defensible 
on the grounds advanced by the first Justice Harlan in the Plessy 
dissent.129  In short, Brown has its defenders among originalists and 
could be provided with a plausible originalist terra firma.  What 
originalists have not come up with is a convincing answer to the more 
narrow criticism of Bolling.130 
B. The Narrow Critique of Bolling 
In addition to the general attack, along the lines just described, 
originalists have another avenue to question the soundness of Bolling.  
The argument is that even assuming the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids segregation as an originalist matter, the Federal Government 
is simply not subject to its strictures.131  The argument certainly has 
textual appeal as the Clause reads: “nor shall any State . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”132  The 
text of the Clause specifies a limitation on state power, rather than a 
grant of a right to every person.  In contrast, the Fifth Amendment is 
a grant of right to every person and reads “[n]o person shall be . . . 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . .  . 
.”133  The fact that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the 
federal government is fatal, from some originalists’ (Robert Bork 
premier among them) perspective, to Bolling’s legitimacy.134  Bork 
levels his attack on Bolling in the passage below: 
Had the Court been guided by the Constitution, it would 
have had to rule that it had no power to strike down the 
District’s laws.  Instead, it seized upon the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment, which does apply to the 
federal government, and announced that this due process 
clause included the same equal protection of the laws 
concept as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
 
 128  See Liptak, supra note 17, at A16 and accompanying text. 
 129  Liptak, supra note 17, at A16; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 
(1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting).   
 130  Some have tried to justify it on the basis of the Ninth Amendment—an 
argument I do not find entirely convincing.  See, e.g., Perry, supra note 15, at 70 (“The 
result in Bolling can be defended in originalist terms, on the basis of the Ninth 
Amendment . . . .”); John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 
967, 1039 (1993) (“[T]he Ninth Amendment . . . is a more likely source for the right 
to be free from discrimination by federal school authorities than the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”).  
 131  See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.  
 132  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 133  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 134  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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amendment.  This rested on no precedent or history.  In 
fact, history compels the opposite conclusion.  The framers 
of the fourteenth amendment adopted the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment but thought it necessary to 
add the equal protection clause, obviously understanding 
that due process, the requirement of fair procedures, did 
not include the requirement of equal protection in the 
substance of state laws. 
 
Bolling, then, was a clear rewriting of the Constitution by the 
Warren Court.  Bolling, however much one likes the result, 
was a substantive due process decision in the same vein as 
Dred Scott and Lochner.  The only justification offered in the 
opinion was that it would be unthinkable that the states 
should be forbidden to segregate and the federal 
government allowed to.  Yes, it would be unthinkable, as a 
matter of morality and of politics.  Most certainly, Congress 
would not and could not have permitted that ugly anomaly 
to persist, and would have had to repeal the District’s 
segregation statutes.  But there is no way to justify the 
Warren Court’s revision of the Constitution to accomplish 
its reforms.  This was not a revision for that case only, as 
some lawless decisions are.  Lawyers and judges now 
regularly attack and scrutinize federal legislation under the 
Court-invented “equal protection component of the due 
process clause.”135 
John Hart Ely (who himself was hardly an originalist)136 in his 
book Democracy and Distrust echoes Bork’s criticism.137  Ely calls 
Bolling’s holding “that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment incorporates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . gibberish both syntactically and 
historically . . . .”138  Ely also agrees with Bork that there is nothing 
“unthinkable” (legally speaking) about the Constitution imposing 
more severe constraints on several states than on the national 
government.139  Ely suggests that “the members of the Reconstruction 
Congress might well have trusted themselves and their successors in a 
way they didn’t trust the existing and future legislatures of Southern 
 
 135  BORK, supra note 15 at 83–84. 
 136  For Ely’s take on proper mode of constitutional interpretation see generally 
ELY, supra note 15. 
 137  See ELY, supra note 15, at 32–33.  
 138  ELY, supra note 15, at 32. 
 139  ELY, supra note 15, at 33. 
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states.”140  Ely is less sanguine than Bork or Hans Linde141 about the 
prospect of Congress repealing D.C.’s segregation laws in the face of 
a split decision in Brown and Bolling.142 
I am skeptical of Bork’s certitude that Congress would have 
rushed to abolish segregation in D.C. schools even if the Supreme 
Court had not ordered it to do so.  One needs just to consider the 
leadership of the Senate and its various committees at the time of 
Brown and the reaction the decision elicited.  The signers of the 1956 
Southern Manifesto143—a declaration which supported defying the 
Supreme Court’s decision—included Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Sr. of 
Virginia (Chairman of the Finance Committee),144 Sen. Richard B. 
Russell, Jr. and Walter F. George, both of Georgia (Chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee145 and President pro tempore of the 
Senate respectively),146 John L. McClellan of Arkansas (Chairman of 
the Government Operations Committee—the committee with 
jurisdiction over the D.C. matters),147 and James O. Eastland of 
Mississippi (Chairman of the Judiciary Committee).148  With the Old 
Bulls of the Senate being arrayed against integration, it is unlikely 
that Congress would have mustered enough votes to repeal (over a 
likely filibuster)149 D.C.’s integration statutes at least in the near-
 
 140  ELY, supra note 15, at 33. 
 141  Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L. J. 227, 234 
(1972) (“A President who had nothing to say about Brown could not well have 
remained silent about the federal District. With serious congressional work on civil 
rights legislation having been foreclosed for years only by Southern filibusters, the 
ultimate outcome could not have been seriously in doubt.”). 
 142  ELY, supra note 15, at 33. 
 143  102 Cong. Rec. 4459–61 (1956). 
 144  Byrd, Harry Flood, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B001208 (last visited Apr. 
19, 2010). 
 145  Russell, Richard Brevard, Jr., BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=R000536 (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2014). 
 146  George, Walter Franklin, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000131 (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2014). 
 147  McClellan, John Little, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000332 (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2014).  For the jurisdiction of the Committee (now named Committee 
on Government Affairs) see Rule XXV(k)(1), Rules of the U.S. Senate, Standing 
Committee, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMIN., 
http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXV (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).  
 148  Eastland, James Oliver, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000018 (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2014).  For a full list of signers see 102 Cong. Rec. 4460–61. 
 149  Although prior to the 1954 elections Democrats were the Senate’s minority 
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term.150  As Professor LeRoy observed, “[c]ongress . . . was the last 
branch to do something to end segregation . . . .  Throughout this 
pivotal decade, Congress was manifestly hostile to the concept of 
desegregation.”151  There is little reason to believe that a Congress so 
hostile to desegregation generally would be moved to abolish 
segregation in the discrete case of D.C. simply for the sake of 
consistency. 
Additionally, however appealing the Bork proposal for a 
legislative solution may be to someone dedicated to pure theory and 
unencumbered by political realities, the fact of the matter remains 
that any theory of constitutional law that would permit the federal 
government to discriminate against one race in favor of another152 
would never win public acceptance.153  To be sure, the fact that a 
 
party, the Republican majority was paper-thin (49-47).  With such a thin majority, it 
would have been nearly impossible to invoke cloture which at the time required an 
affirmative vote of 2/3 of the entire Senate.  For a history of the filibuster and the 
cloture rule, see generally Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option 
to Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Over Come the Filibuster, 28 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205 (2004).  Six months after the Brown decision, Democrats 
reclaimed the Senate majority; see http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history
/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited April 23, 2014). Republicans 
controlled 48 seats + 1 independent (Wayne Morse) who caucused with them in the 
83rd Congress (1953–55).  
 150  Interestingly enough, the Executive Branch was much more sympathetic to 
the integration of the D.C.’s schools.  Although President Eisenhower was not 
particularly enthusiastic about either plaintiffs’ claims in Brown and Bolling or the 
outcome of the decisions, his Solicitor General actually argued as amicus curiae in 
support of the petitioners (mostly as a result of the Truman’s Department of Justice 
involvement in the earlier stages of litigation) and Eisenhower famously sent troops 
to Little Rock, Arkansas in order to enforce the desegregation orders.  Michael J. 
Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 131–32 
(1994).  
 151  Michael H. LeRoy, Presidential Regulation of Private Employment: Constitutionality 
of Executive Order 12,954 Debarment of Contractors Who Hire Permanent Striker 
Replacements, 37 B.C. L. REV. 229, 287 (1996).   
 152  Bork is openly advocating just such a system.  He argues that absent the 
“illegitimate” Bolling decision, federal affirmative action programs would be 
invulnerable to an attack because federal government is not required to abide by the 
equal protection requirements.  See BORK, supra note 15, at 74, 84.  Bork sees this as 
the reason why the political liberals ought to oppose Bolling.  See BORK, supra note 15, 
at 84.  The problem is that under Bork’s approach nothing would preclude Congress 
from instituting different naturalization, tax, national service, criminal, and other 
laws for different races.  Bork and others see that as politically impossible, see BORK, 
supra note 15, at 83; Barnett & Sunstein, supra note 16 (and perhaps they are correct 
as of today), but that fails to account for the fact that Bolling is one of the major 
reasons why this is politically impossible.  Given the American history of race 
relations, it is not particularly plausible to take Bork’s assurances of a Congress 
committed to racial equality on faith alone.  
 153  See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  To be sure, the public may not care 
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particular interpretive methodology does not find much public 
support is not in and of itself proof that the methodology is wrong or 
that the public is right.  However, any interpretive legal methodology 
has to be applied by judges, who are appointed by politicians 
responsible to the public.  It is inconceivable that any politician 
would nominate or vote to confirm a person who would openly say 
that the federal government has an unfettered right to discriminate 
on the basis of race.  For this reason, any theory of constitutional 
interpretation, if it is meant to survive outside the hallowed halls of 
academic institutions, must be acceptable to the body politic.154 
Fortunately for the adherents of originalism (even for purists 
and not just “faint-hearted” Scalias),155 Bork’s insistence that “there is 
no way to justify”156 Bolling on originalist grounds is wrong.  Bork and 
Ely are correct that “reverse incorporation,” as an originalist matter, 
is “gibberish.”157  But that is not the end of the inquiry, for the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not begin and end with the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Indeed, the first part of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—the Citizenship Clause—binds both the states and the 
federal government equally.  It is my contention that the Citizenship 
Clause, as originally understood, would bar race-based discrimination 
by the federal government.  It is to this argument that I now turn. 
IV. THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE 
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
very first clause therein, preceding the Equal Protection and the Due 
Process Clauses.158  Yet, it has been largely ignored in both the 
historiography and the jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
At most, the courts have held that the clause confers birthright 
citizenship.159  But the court never explored what citizenship actually 
means.  To the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the other 
 
about theories as such.  The public’s focus is likely to be outcomes.  But a theory that 
permits outcomes repugnant to the public is not likely to be accepted as legitimate 
approach to reasoned judicial decision-making. 
 154  See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.  
 155  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) 
(“I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot 
imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that 
imposes the punishment of flogging.”). 
 156  BORK, supra note 15, at 84. 
 157  See ELY, supra note 15, at 32; supra text accompanying note 16.   
 158  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside.”). 
 159  See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
DOLIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2014  12:16 PM 
2014] RESOLVING THE ORIGINAL SIN 777 
hand, the clause was not a nullity or an insignificant appendage.  
Indeed, Senator Trumbull emphasized that citizenship “of the United 
States carries with it some rights . . . . They are those inherent, 
fundamental rights which belong to free citizens or free men in all 
countries . . . . The right of American citizenship means 
something.”160  In figuring out what that “something” is, one needs to 
consider the goals of the Amendment. 
At its very basic level, the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to 
overrule Dred Scott v. Sanford.161  In that decision, Chief Justice Taney 
opined that “[t]he negro race [was] a separate class of persons, 
and . . . that they were not . . . a portion of the people or citizens of 
the [United States] . . . .”162  The holding applied not just to the 
blacks held in bondage, but to all black residents of the United 
States.163  According to Taney: 
It [was] obvious that they [the slaves and their descendants, 
whether free or not] were not even in the minds of the 
framers of the Constitution when they were conferring 
special rights and privileges upon the citizens of a State in 
every other part of the Union. . . . Indeed, . . . it is 
impossible to believe that these rights and privileges were 
intended to be extended to them.164 
Following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice 
 
 160  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866).  This sentiment was echoed 
in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76–81 (1873) (discussing various rights that 
citizenship bestows).  See also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1973) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In constitutionally defining who is a citizen of the 
United States, Congress obviously thought it was doing something, and something 
important. Citizenship meant something, a status in and relationship with a society 
which is continuing and more basic than mere presence or residence.”). 
 161  Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).  See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
502–03 & n.15 (1999) (“The Fourteenth Amendment overruled [the Dred Scott] 
decision.”); Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 652 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The paramount 
reason was to amend the Constitution so as to overrule explicitly the Dred Scott 
decision.”); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 73 (“[The 14th Amendment] declares 
that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship 
of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons 
born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United 
States.  That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit 
of no doubt.”); Robert J. Shulman, Comment, Children of a Lesser God: Should the 
Fourteenth Amendment be Altered or Repealed to Deny Automatic Citizenship Rights and 
Privileges to American Born Children of Illegal Aliens?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 669, 692 (1995) 
(“The main purpose for enacting the Fourteenth Amendment was to overrule one of 
the greatest inequities of American justice, the Dred Scott case.”). 
 162  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411. 
 163  Id. at 411–21 (explaining why both slaves and “free persons of color were not 
citizens, within the meaning of the Constitution and laws . . . .”). 
 164  Id. at 411–12 (emphasis added). 
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Bradley in his dissent to The Slaughterhouse Cases wrote that: 
[T]he citizens of each of the States and the citizens of the 
United States would be entitled to certain privileges and 
immunities as citizens, at the hands of their own 
government—privileges and immunities which their own 
governments respectively would be bound to respect and 
maintain.  In this free country, the people of which 
inherited certain traditionary rights and privileges from 
their ancestors, citizenship means something.  It has certain 
privileges and immunities attached to it which the 
government, whether restricted by express or implied 
limitations, cannot take away or impair.  It may do so 
temporarily by force, but it cannot do so by right. And these 
privileges and immunities attach as well to citizenship of the 
United States as to citizenship of the States.165 
Bradley’s opinion suggests that at a minimum, all citizens of the 
United States were entitled to certain rights and immunities inherent 
in the traditions of a free country.166  Whereas under Dred Scott these 
rights were available only to the white citizens,167 post-adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and according to its text, the rights became 
available to “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States.”168  
The question then is what are the “rights and privileges” that accrue 
to those lucky enough to be accorded national citizenship? 
One of the earliest cases discussing the rights of privileges of 
national citizenship was Corfield v. Coryell,169 delivered by Justice 
Bushrod Washington in his capacity as Circuit Justice.  Justice 
Washington asked “what are the privileges and immunities of citizens 
in the several states?”170  He then answered that these refer to: 
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, 
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all 
free governments; and which have, at all times, been 
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose 
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, 
independent, and sovereign.  What these fundamental 
 
 165  The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 166  Id.  Though Bradley was in dissent on the ultimate conclusion that the 
challenged statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment, his point that citizenship 
entitled people to certain rights qua citizens was not disputed.  The only dispute 
centered on what those rights were.  See, e.g., id. at 75–76 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 
F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)). 
 167  See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text. 
 168  See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 73. 
 169  Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 546. 
 170  Id. at 551. 
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principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than 
difficult to enumerate.  They may, however, be all 
comprehended under the following general heads: 
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of 
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; 
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government 
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.171 
While Justice Washington did not expound on what he meant by 
“protection of the government,” the above passage had a clear legal 
meaning by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted.  The 
Corfield case was cited with some regularity in the debates.172  For 
instance, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted by the same Congress 
that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment, provided that: 
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any 
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to 
be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and 
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude . . . . shall have the same right, in every State 
and Territory of the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to 
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.173 
John Bingham, though he fought for the deletion of references 
to segregated schools in the Civil Rights Act,174 argued that the rights 
of citizenship included the notion “that all men, before the law, are 
equal in respect of those rights of person which God gives and no 
 
 171  Id. at 551–52. 
 172  See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 526 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Corfield 
indisputably influenced the Members of Congress who enacted the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  When Congress gathered to debate the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Members frequently, if not as a matter of course, appealed to Corfield, arguing that 
the Amendment was necessary to guarantee the fundamental rights that Justice 
Washington identified in his opinion.”); David H. Gans, The Unitary Fourteenth 
Amendment, 56 EMORY L.J. 907, 918 (2007) (“Corfield v. Coryell [was] invoked time and 
again during debates over the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); Kurt T. Lash, The 
Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 467 (2001) (“Corfield was used throughout the 
Reconstruction debates in Congress . . . .”). 
 173  Ch. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 
(2011)). 
 174  See supra note 79 and accompanying text.   
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man or state may rightfully take away . . . .”175  Bingham argued that 
the Constitution is a “great charter of our rights, almost divine in its 
conception and in its spirit of equality,” and should not be tarnished 
“by the interpolation into it of any word of caste, such as white, or 
black, male or female . . . .”176  Senator Trumbull, in arguing for the 
Civil Rights Act, stated that it was “a bill providing that all people 
shall have equal rights,” that the bill would “declare[] that all persons 
in the United States shall be entitled to the same civil rights . . . 
[including the right to] enjoy  liberty and happiness,” and that it 
“protects a white man as much as a black man[.]”177  According to 
Trumbull, citizenship conferred upon individuals “those inherent, 
fundamental rights which belong to free citizens or free men in all 
countries . . . .”178  Perhaps the most explicit statement by Trumbull 
was his quotation from Blackstone’s maxim that “the law should be 
equal to all, or as much so as the nature of things will admit,”179 and 
that “any statute which is not equal to all . . . is, in fact, a badge of 
servitude which, by the Constitution, is prohibited.”180  Similarly, 
Senator Jacob Howard, in introducing the Fourteenth Amendment, 
stated that it “establishes equality before the law, and it gives to the 
humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights 
and the same protection before the law as it gives to the most 
powerful, the most wealthy, or the most haughty.”181  Representative 
Martin Thayer added that: 
The sole purpose of the bill is to secure to [blacks] the 
fundamental rights of citizenship; those rights which 
constitute the essence of freedom, and which are common 
to the citizens of all civilized States; those rights which 
secure life, liberty, and property, and which make all men 
equal before the law . . . .”182 
The common thread in all of these statements is that the framers 
of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment viewed 
citizenship as bestowing a right to equality before the law irrespective 
of race. 
Charles Sumner, whose views were admittedly to the far end of 
the spectrum, but who was highly influential in drafting and 
 
 175  CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859).  
 176  Id.  
 177  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1859). 
 178  Id. at 1757. 
 179  Id.  
 180  Id. at 474. 
 181  Id. at 2766 (emphasis added). 
 182  Id. at 1152. 
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shepherding the Civil Rights Acts and the Reconstruction 
Amendments through Congress spoke of the Citizenship Clause 
thusly: 
No longer an African, [the emancipated slave] is an 
American; no longer a slave, he is a common part of the 
Republic, owing to it patriotic allegiance in return for the 
protection of equal laws. By incorporation with the body-politic 
he becomes a partner in that transcendent unity, so that 
there can be no injury to him without injury to all. Insult to 
him is insult to an American citizen. Dishonor to him is 
dishonor to the Republic itself. . . . Our rights are his rights; 
our equality is his equality; our privileges and immunities are 
his great freehold.183 
Although Sumner in his absolutist position may have been an 
outlier, his description of citizenship as an exchange of “patriotic 
allegiance . . . for the protection of equal laws,” was a fair 
representation of what citizenship was viewed to mean.184  John 
Locke’s theory of social compact, which was influential both during 
the framing of the original Constitution and the Reconstruction 
Amendments,185 posited that people submit to a lawful authority of 
the government in return for the government’s protection.186  Justice 
Joseph Story, in his famous Commentaries on the Constitution, 
published shortly after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
opined that the constitutional meaning of the term “citizen” is “a 
person owing allegiance to the government, and entitled to 
protection from it.”187 
Given the understanding of the framers and ratifiers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that citizenship conferred “a status in and 
 
 183  14 CHARLES SUMNER, THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 407 (Boston, Lee & 
Shepard, 1883) (emphasis added). 
 184  Id. 
 185  Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 681, 696, 700 (1997) (“The concept of citizenship that serves as a foundation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment originates in the social compact theories of John Locke 
and other natural law theorists. . . . The relevance of Lockean social compact theory 
to understanding the meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is clear 
from the tenor of the debates in Congress.”); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection 
and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 281, 312 (2000) (“The ‘social compact’ theory of John Locke, who believed that 
people submit to the authority of the government in return for its protection, was 
very influential at the time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 186   See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 370 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690); Zietlow, supra note 185, at 312. 
 187  2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
683 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Little, Brown, & Co., 1891). 
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relationship with a society which is continuing and more basic than 
mere presence or residence,”188 and required the government to 
provide “protection” to the bearer of the title, the only question that 
truly remains is whether such protection could be provided on 
racially unequal terms.  In my view, the Citizenship Clause does not 
permit such discrimination even if Charles Sumner’s views are to be 
discounted as not representative of Congressmen and state legislators 
of the time (who ratified the Amendment). 
It is worth noting that in talking about the rights and privileges 
of citizenship, both before and after the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the judges, legislators, and commentators consistently 
referred to “traditionary rights and privileges” or “privileges and 
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental.”189  It is especially 
noteworthy that Corfield, in grappling with the question of which 
rights are fundamental, essentially paraphrased the Declaration of 
Independence.190  It can be said that the approach of the Declaration 
was adopted by the Corfield Court in describing what rights accrue to 
those possessing American citizenship.  And if that is true, then it 
would follow that the Declaration’s exhortations that “all men are 
created equal” and that the government was instituted “to secure 
these rights”191 of equality figured into Corfield Court’s analysis of the 
scope of citizenship’s privileges and immunities. 
Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, the framers and the 
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment drew heavily on Locke’s ideas 
about the proper role of government and interrelationship between 
the citizen and the State.192  Locke, in turn, held that “as a citizen—
that is, as an individual consenting to the formation of government—
[a] man [is] ‘by Nature, all free, equal, and independent.’”193  In 
 
 188  Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 189  Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230); 
supra notes 173–182 and accompanying text. 
 190  Compare Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52 (“Protection by the government; the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every 
kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety . . . .”), with THE DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that 
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.”). 
 191   THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men . . . .”). 
 192  See supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text. 
 193  Joy Gordon, The Concept of Human Rights: The History and Meaning of Its 
Politicization, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 689, 739–40 (1998) (quoting LOCKE, supra note 
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other words, Locke argued that “all citizens have equal intrinsic 
worth for purposes of government. . . . [and] the interests of all 
citizens count equally in government . . . .”194 
Moreover, as Douglas Smith points out in his work: 
[A]n equality-based or nondiscrimination guarantee also flows 
from the textual language. As many commentators have recognized, a 
substantive guarantee of absolute rights implies an equality of rights 
because all citizens enjoy the same substantive guarantee. As I have 
argued elsewhere, however, an equality-based guarantee concerning 
regulation also flows from the text. One of the privileges and 
immunities of citizens was understood to be a guarantee of equality 
in regulation of the fundamental rights of citizens.195 
In other words, since the Citizenship Clause guarantees every 
citizen certain privileges and immunities, all citizens receive at least 
these rights on equal basis.  As Akhil Amar puts it, “[a]ll are declared 
citizens, and thus all are equal citizens.”196  Since one of the rights of 
citizenship is government protection, it follows that the protection 
must be extended on equal basis.  An objection may be made that 
public schooling is not a right or privilege of citizenship,197 and that 
therefore the government is not required to protect the provision of 
this service on equal basis.  That would be error.  While it is true that 
schooling was not considered to be part of the panoply of 
“fundamental” or “traditionary” rights of citizenship,198 the 
Citizenship Clause goes not to the specific question of schooling, but 
to broader question of discriminatory treatment by the government 
of its citizens.  The prohibited conduct is not the non-provision of 
schooling, but rather creating various classes of citizenship and the 
provision of services based on such classifications.199  Whether or not 
schooling in and of itself is a fundamental right of citizenship, thus, is 
 
186, at 348). 
 194  Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign 
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1225 (1994). 
 195  Douglas G. Smith, A Lockean Analysis of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1095, 1157 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
 196  Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 768 (1999); see also 
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896) (Harlan, J.) (“All citizens are equal 
before the law.”). 
 197  Schooling is not mentioned in Corfield, and indeed the Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that schooling is a right of citizenship.  San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 198   See id. at 37.  But see Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 
116 YALE L.J. 330 (2006) (arguing that education is a right inherent in “national 
citizenship”).  
 199  See supra notes 180–183 and accompanying text. 
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not the issue.  The only issue is whether the federal government is 
required to offer protection on an equal basis to all citizens seeking 
to avail themselves of various government programs. 
This approach is consistent with the common law as explicated 
by William Blackstone, which, after all, forms the basis for the 
understanding of legal terminology of the original Constitution and 
the amendments thereto.200  Blackstone opined that laws that treated 
a gentleman and a commoner differently “savoured of oppression,” 
and was thus repugnant to English liberties.201  According to 
Blackstone, “the laws of England, [are] peculiarly adapted to the 
preservation of this inestimable blessing [of liberty] even in the meanest 
subject.”202  Indeed, the “spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our 
constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, 
the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection of the 
laws, and with regard to all natural rights becomes eo instanti a 
freeman,”203 who would be entitled to all of the “absolute rights of 
individuals” that Blackstone describes.204  From this exposition on the 
laws of England it is evident that under common law, all subjects were 
equal before the law, even the lowliest ones (including those of 
different skin color and former slaves).  These precepts of common 
law informed the citizenship concepts embedded in the original 
Constitution.205  The Fourteenth Amendment extended those 
concepts to “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,”206 
including former slaves and their descendants.  It follows then that 
the rights of equality before the law inherent in the concept of 
citizenship now extended to blacks in exactly the same manner as 
they extended to other freemen.207 
Finally, when interpreting the meaning of the Citizenship 
 
 200  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
261–68 (1998) (discussing the centrality of Blackstone to the American Constitution 
and on the Reconstruction Congress specifically); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in 
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 
661 n.71 (1999) (stating that Framers’ understanding of the law was influenced by 
Blackstone); Yoo, supra note 130, at 982 (“William Blackstone’s Commentaries 
provided the Framers with a model of how the law could protect such natural rights.  
The Framers held Blackstone in high regard for his attempt to rationalize the 
English common law.”). 
 201  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *122. 
 202  Id. at *123.   
 203  Id. 
 204  Id. at *117. 
 205  See supra note 200.   
 206  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 207  See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872). 
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Clause, it helps to read it in the context of the times and of related 
Reconstruction Era enactments.  One of the major creations of the 
Reconstruction Era Congresses was the Bureau of Refugees, 
Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, commonly known as the 
Freedman’s Bureau.208  As Professor Lester observes, Congress 
enacted the Freedman’s Bureau Act “to make clear that black citizens 
had the right not just to be free from bondage, but to participate as 
equal citizens in all aspects of American life.”209  The Freedman’s 
Bureau Act was enacted by the Thirty-Ninth Congress, as were the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Much like 
the Civil Rights Acts, the Freedman’s Bureau Act provided that rights 
“shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens of such State or 
district without respect to race or color, or previous condition of 
slavery.”210  The goal of the Freedman’s Bureau was to elevate blacks 
formerly oppressed by slavery to a place where they could enjoy the 
benefits of citizenship on equal footing with whites.211  The Freedman 
Bureau Acts sought to “integrate these new citizens into American 
politics,”212 and to “induct them, as it were, into the great temple of 
American civilization.”213  In arguing for the bill, Congressman 
Ignatius Donnelly said that “[i]f you give the negro an equal 
opportunity with the white man he becomes perforce a property-
holder and a law-maker, and he is interested with you in preserving 
the peace of the country.”214  He argued that in order to erase the 
vestiges of slavery “we must make all the citizens of the country equal 
before the law; that we must break down all walls of caste; that we 
must offer equal opportunities to all men.”215  Donnelly’s argument 
essentially is that in order to expect loyalty from the freed blacks (a 
duty of citizenship), one must provide them with rights equal to those 
of other citizens. 
The debate over the Freedman’s Bureau Act shows that the 
paramount goal of the Thirty-Ninth Congress in enacting this (and 
 
 208  Ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865); ch. 200, 14 Stat. 176 (1866).   
 209  Toni Lester, Contention, Context and the Constitution: Riding the Waves of the 
Affirmative Action Debate, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 90 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 210  Freedman's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77 (1866).   
 211  See James W. Fox, Jr., Democratic Citizenship and Congressional Reconstruction: 
Defining and Implementing the Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship, 13 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 453, 467 (2004) (“[T]he Freedman’s Bureau developed citizenship.”).   
 212  William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Pluralist Theory of the Equal Protection Clause, 11 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1239, 1250–51 (2009). 
 213  7 GREAT DEBATES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: CIVIL RIGHTS, PART ONE 171 (Marion 
Mills Miller ed., 1913) (quoting Rep. William D. Kelley). 
 214  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 589 (1865). 
 215  Id. 
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other) legislation was to provide opportunity for the newly-made 
black citizens so that they could participate in all aspects of American 
civil life.  It seemed preposterous to the proponents that this full 
participation could be achieved without requiring equal legal 
treatment of all of the citizens.216 
The history of the Citizenship Clause strongly suggests that the 
original understanding of that provision required the federal 
government to extend equal protection of laws to all its citizens and 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race.  This requirement 
stems from the understanding of what it means to be a citizen and 
the rights, privileges, and immunities that citizenship conferred.  In 
other words, to be a citizen means now and meant then to be 
“presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society as a 
respected, responsible, and participating member.  Stated negatively, 
the principle forbids the organized society to treat an individual as a 
member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant.”217 
V. CRITICISM OF THE APPROACH, AND A RESPONSE THERETO 
In my view there are three major criticisms of my argument that 
could be made.  While perhaps not an exhaustive list of possible 
objections, in my view, these are the most preeminent and the ones 
that deserve a detailed response.  I will discuss each of them in turn, 
and offer a rebuttal. 
A. Redundancy 
One of the main charges leveled against the reasoning in Bolling 
is that the Court conflated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due 
Process Clause, rendering them redundant.  According to the Court, 
“the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming 
from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive,”218 
and are apparently often (though not “always”) “interchangeable 
phrases.”219  This reading of the constitutional text readily opens itself 
up to criticism as it violates the “the sound and wise rule of 
constitutional construction early announced and often applied . . .—
that in expounding the Constitution of the United States no word in 
it can be rejected as superfluous or unmeaning . . . .”220  But if that 
 
 216  See id. 
 217  KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 3 (1989).   
 218  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
 219  Id.  
 220  National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 407 (1920) (Clark, J., dissenting); see 
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criticism is fair, then the same criticism could be leveled at the 
interpretive approach proposed in this Article.  After all, the 
Citizenship Clause binds both the federal and state governments, and 
if the clause mandates equal treatment, then it would seem that the 
Equal Protection Clause is surplassage. 
On the surface, this is an appealing argument.  However, upon 
the closer examination of the text and history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the objection can be rebutted.  First, the language of 
the Citizenship Clause and the Equal Protection Clause do not cover 
the same group of people.  Whereas the Citizenship Clause applies 
only to the “born or naturalized in the United States,”221 the Equal 
Protection Clause, by its terms applies to “to any person within its 
jurisdiction.”222  The Equal Protection Clause, then, sweeps within its 
ambit a broader swath of people.  In other words, states may not be 
permitted to refuse protection of their laws to non-citizen residents 
or visitors. The federal government, on the other hand, following the 
original understanding of the Citizenship Clause and recognizing 
that the Equal Protection Clause is not binding upon it, is permitted 
to deny equal protection of federal laws to non-citizens.223 
As a number of scholars have written, the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment viewed national citizenship as primary over 
state citizenship.224  The Equal Protection Clause can thus be read as 
precluding states from abridging the rights of national citizenship225 
irrespective of whether the national citizen is a resident——and 
therefore a citizen—of the State in question.  This was consistent with 
 
also Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 87 (1900) (“[An] elementary canon of 
construction . . . requires that effect be given to each word of the Constitution.”).   
 221  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 222  Id. 
 223  See generally Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649–64 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “people” referred to in the Equal Protection Clause is a 
group different from “citizens” referred to in the Citizenship Clause). 
 224  See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States: The 
History and the Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 77, 113 (2009) (“[T]he citizenship 
clause indicates a change: that instead of national citizenship being derivative from 
state citizenship, and state citizenship being primary, the framers made national 
citizenship primary.”); Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and 
Cruikshank in Constitutional Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2009) (“The 
Framers of the 14th Amendment made state citizenship secondary to national 
citizenship.”).   
 225  See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 n.15 (1999) (“The Amendment’s Privileges 
or Immunities Clause and Citizenship Clause guaranteed the rights of newly freed 
black citizens by ensuring that they could claim the state citizenship of any State in 
which they resided and by precluding that State from abridging their rights of 
national citizenship.”). 
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the Reconstruction Era vision of reunifying the country as truly 
national as opposed to a mere confederation of sovereign states.226  
The Equal Protection Clause thus permitted free travel and migration 
and encouraged a national economy because it precluded states from 
refusing to provide equal protection of the laws to those who were 
not citizens of the relevant state, yet were citizens of the United 
States.227 
Second, it should be pointed out that there were different views 
as to which rights sprung from national and which from state 
citizenship.228  Although it is now widely agreed that The Slaughterhouse 
Cases were incorrectly decided,229 they are useful in pointing out that 
the view that most of the rights of citizenship sprung from state 
rather than national citizenship was widely—though not 
predominantly—held.230  Indeed, as the majority in The Slaughterhouse 
Cases held, “there is a citizenship of the United States, and a 
citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which 
depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the 
individual.”231  If Justice Miller was right in his assertion and also right 
in that the rights of the federal citizenship are limited,232 then the 
Equal Protection Clause would not be at all redundant.  Rather, the 
Equal Protection Clause serves to cabin states’ discretion in treatment 
 
 226  See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century 
Race Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923, 1957 (2000) (noting “[t]he Radical Republicans’ 
vision of a strong national government”).  
 227  Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
66, 74 (2001) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment provided direct protection and 
authority for Congress to protect national rights of travel and migration.”).   
 228  See generally Pamela Brandwein, Slavery as an Interpretive Issue in the 
Reconstruction Congresses, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 315 (2000) (discussing the views of 
Northern Democrats and Republicans on the concept of citizenship and how those 
views found their audience in The Slaughterhouse Cases majority and dissenting 
opinions, respectively).  It bears repeating that the individual views of the framers are 
not determinative in deciphering the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
However, their statements (together with the underlying political philosophy of the 
time) serve as evidence as to what the ratifiers understood the legal language to 
mean.  
 229  See, e.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. at 522 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Legal scholars 
agree on little beyond the conclusion that the Clause does not mean what the Court 
said it meant in 1873 [in The Slaughterhouse Cases].”).   
 230  See Brandwein, supra note 228, at 354–55 (stating that Northern Democrats 
subscribed to this view). 
 231  The Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1872).   
 232  I am not suggesting that he was indeed right.  Rather, what I am suggesting is 
that many people subscribed to Slaughterhouse’s majority view.  And if so, then from 
the perspective of those people, the Equal Protection Clause would not be 
redundant because it would protect things other than the Citizenship Clause would 
protect. 
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of individuals with respect to those rights that do not flow from 
national citizenship. 
To be sure, this Article’s conception of the Citizenship Clause 
and the Equal Protection Clause are somewhat overlapping.  The 
Equal Protection Clause alone would require states to treat all of its 
citizens equally whether or not the Citizenship Clause were binding 
on the states.  However, what makes the present approach different 
from that in Bolling is that under my approach the clauses are not 
duplicative.233  The Equal Protection Clause covers a broader segment 
of the population and restricts the power of individual states more so 
than the Citizenship Clause alone would.  As a result, under my 
approach, the Equal Protection Clause precludes states from 
imposing residency length requirements for full state citizenship and 
thereafter discriminating on that basis. 
B. Women as Citizens 
The second objection to my approach is the question of the 
rights of women.  On one hand, women could certainly be “born or 
naturalized in the United States,” thus making them citizens by the 
terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.  On the other hand, and just as 
certainly, women were not treated equally to men in a number of 
areas. Consequently, the argument goes, the original understanding 
of the Citizenship Clause could not have included equal treatment of 
all citizens.  And if so, then even if Bolling could be sustained on 
originalist grounds, as previously described, a number of other 
decisions recognizing unlawfulness of gender-based discrimination 
could not.234  This would in turn bring us right back to square one in 
 
 233  Although the Bolling Court stated that it did not hold that the Due Process 
Clause and Equal Protection Clause were co-extensive, in practice, there is no 
difference between the two.  See notes 218–219 and accompanying discussion.  
Indeed, judges and commentators casually refer to the “equal protection component 
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”  Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 n.9 
(2008); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 105 (2001); United 
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 204 (1995); see also, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due 
Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 325 n.90 
(1993); Laura Gaston Dooley, Equal Protection and the Procedural Bar Doctrine in Federal 
Habeas Corpus, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 738 n.15 (1991); James T. Lang, Note, Should 
I Stay or Should I Go: The National Guard Dances to the Tune Called by Two Masters, 39 
CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 165, 199 n.186 (1989); Amy K. Posner, Note, Victim Impact 
Statements and Restitution: Making the Punishment Fit the Victim, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 301, 
316 n.89 (1984).  
 234  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down a male-
only admission policy to a state-run military academy); Miss. Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (striking down a female-only admission policy to a state-
DOLIN PROOF.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2014  12:16 PM 
790 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:749 
terms of convincing the public that originalism is a sustainable and 
desirable judicial philosophy. 
I will admit upfront that this is a tough objection to get around.  
However, it is not insurmountable.  As an initial matter, it should be 
pointed out that women were not nearly as rights-less as often 
portrayed.  As Professor Amar points out, “[a]lthough . . . women 
could not vote, hold office, sit on juries, or serve in militias, they 
could worship, speak, print, assemble, petition, sue, contract, own 
property and bring diversity cases in federal courts.”235  Additionally, 
by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, a majority of 
states236 enacted some version of the Married Women’s Property 
Act,237 which permitted married women to hold, enjoy, and dispose of 
property on par with men and did away with the common-law rule 
that places the male in charge of all marital property.238  Similarly, the 
1862 Homestead Act,239 enacted just a few years prior to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, did not differentiate between citizens 
seeking to avail themselves of the Act’s provisions on the basis of 
gender.240  At the same time, some states also began to treat women 
 
run nursing school); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) 
(holding unconstitutional a state statute that discriminated between widowers and 
widows in distribution of death benefits); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) 
(holding unconstitutional and discriminatory against women a policy that provided 
lower Social Security survivor benefits to widowers than widows); Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (same); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding 
unconstitutional a statute that discriminated on the bases of gender in assignment of 
estate executors). 
 235  AMAR, supra note 200, at 260.  
 236  Married Women’s Property Laws, Law Library of Congress, 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awlaw3/property_law.html (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2014) (“During the nineteenth century, states began enacting common law 
principles affecting the property rights of married women. Married women’s 
property acts differ in language, and their dates of passage span many years. One of 
the first was enacted by Connecticut in 1809, allowing women to write wills. The 
majority of states passed similar statutes in the 1850s.”). 
 237  See Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of 
Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2022 (2000) (stating that states began to pass such laws in the 
1840s). 
 238  See Nicole M. Quester, Note, Refusing to Remove an Obstacle to the Remedy: The 
Supreme Court’s Decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales Continues to Deny Domestic 
Violence Victims Meaningful Recourse, 40 AKRON L. REV. 391, 395–98 (2007) (describing 
the effect of Married Women’s Property Acts); see also 1848 N.Y. Laws 307.  The New 
York Act was a model for other states.  See Married Women’s Property Laws, LAW LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awlaw3/property_law.html 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2014) (containing the text of the New York statute of 1848). 
 239  The Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976). 
 240  The Act read: 
[A]ny person who is the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age 
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equally when it came to entering into contracts.241  In short, around 
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, both state and 
federal governments began to recognize that at least in some spheres 
women were indeed entitled to equal rights by virtue of their 
citizenship.  That is not to say that women were indeed treated 
equally to men in all respects, but rather to recognize the significant, 
though far from complete, movement in the direction of equal 
citizenship for men and women that was occurring in the middle of 
the nineteenth century.242 
Beyond this move towards equality of citizenship, one must also 
consider the reasons for the discrimination between men and 
women.  Unlike the post-Civil War Black Codes in the Southern 
states, which had as its purpose the perpetuation of subservient status 
of freedmen,243 the laws dealing with women’s rights were predicated 
on the notion of “protecting” women from the vicissitudes and 
cruelty of the everyday world.244  “[W]omen were seen as weak and 
needing protection, not only for themselves, but also for the survival 
of society.”245  This sentiment was clearly expressed in Justice Bradley’s 
 
of twenty-one years, and is a citizen of the United States, . . . shall, from, 
and after the first January, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, be 
entitled to enter one quarter section or a less quantity of 
unappropriated public lands, upon which said person may have filed a 
preemption claim, or which may, at the time the application is made, 
be subject to preemption at one dollar and twenty-five cents, or less, 
per acre; . . . .  
Sec. 2: And be it further enacted. . . . upon application to the register 
of the land office in which he or she is about to make such entry, make 
affidavit before the said register or receiver that he or she is the head of 
a family. . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 241  See, e.g., 1860 N.Y. Laws 157 (“An Act Concerning the Rights and Liabilities of 
Husband and Wife”), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1860/03/21
/news/rights-married-women-act-concerning-rights-liabilities-husband-wife.html (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2014). 
 242  See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on 
Behalf of Battered Women who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 12 (1986) (noting that Married 
Women’s Property Acts improved the legal status of women, but in many instances 
only marginally).   
 243  See, e.g., Abel A. Bartley, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Great Equalizer of the 
American People, 36 AKRON L. REV. 473, 480 (2003) (“These so-called ‘Black codes’ 
were designed to restore slavery under a different guise and represented the South’s 
reluctance to accept the free status of African Americans.”); Douglas L. Colbert, 
Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1995) 
(“[S]outhern states enacted Black Code laws, which were intended to perpetuate 
African American slavery.”). 
 244  See BLACKSTONE, supra note 202, at *433 (stating that “the disabilities, which 
the wife lies under, are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit.”). 
 245  Bela August Walker, Fractured Bonds: Policing Whiteness and Womanhood Through 
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concurrence in Bradwell v. State246—a case that upheld Illinois’ rule 
prohibiting women from being admitted to the bar.  Justice Bradley 
opined that: 
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.  
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs 
to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the 
occupations of civil life. . . .  The paramount destiny and 
mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign 
offices of wife and mother. . . . 
 
The humane movements of modern society, which have for 
their object the multiplication of avenues for woman’s 
advancement, and of occupations adapted to her condition 
and sex, have my heartiest concurrence. . . . [I]t is within 
the province of the legislature to ordain what offices, 
positions, and callings shall be filled and discharged by 
men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies and 
responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are 
presumed to predominate in the sterner sex.247 
It is evident from this passage that the legislators and judges of 
the time perceived restrictions upon women’s rights not as special 
burdens to be carried by women, but as a protective barrier against 
the rough-and-tumble of the encounters with the “sterner sex.”248  As 
misguided and patronizing as this approach may have been (and it 
certainly was that) the position of the Fourteenth Amendment 
framers seems to have been that women were indeed equal citizens, 
but that laws needed to be made in order to “protect[] women 
 
Race-Based Marriage Annulments, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 33 (2008). 
 246  83 U.S. 130 (1872). 
 247  Id. at 141–42 (Bradley, J., concurring).   
 248  Id. at 142.  This idea of protecting women survived for quite a while.  Indeed 
much of beneficent legislation in areas such as workers’ rights and occupational 
health and safety was crafted (and upheld) on the grounds that women deserved 
special protection.  See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 394 (1937) 
(upholding a minimum wage statute on the grounds that the State has an interest in 
“protecting women against oppression . . . .”); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422–
23 (1908) (upholding a statute limiting women’s workday in laundries to ten hours 
on the grounds that the “difference [in the sexes’ structure of body, in the functions 
to be performed by each, in the amount of physical strength]  justifies a difference in 
legislation, and upholds that which is designed to compensate for some of the 
burdens which rest upon [women].”).  See also Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 
(1915) (upholding special rules about women’s employment in hospitals); Miller v. 
Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (upholding special rules about women’s employment in 
hotels); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) (upholding special rules about 
women’s employment in factories). 
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against oppression.”249  In the eyes of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, only through such “protection,” and perhaps 
incremental exposure to the brutality of the world outside the 
home,250 would women be able to actually enjoy their rights of 
citizenship. 
In some ways this attitude towards women is reminiscent of the 
approach that was taken towards freedmen.  As alluded to supra,251 the 
Reconstruction Congress adopted a number of statutes that sought to 
better the lot of freedmen and “raise them up” to a point where they 
could be equal citizens.252  The Freedman’s Bureau, for instance, was 
meant to “protect” the ability of freedmen to work and get properly 
compensated for that work.253  The Reconstruction Congress was not 
convinced that the newly freed blacks could achieve on their own 
without the Bureau’s help in entering and enforcing contracts.254  
When one looks at the legislation affecting women through this lens, 
one can acknowledge that the framers and contemporaries of the 
Fourteenth Amendment were wrong, but ultimately driven by the 
good intention of protecting a woman’s ability to enjoy her “noble 
and benign offices”255 in society and to enjoy her rights of citizenship 
accordingly.  From this perspective then, it is quite plausible to 
believe that the Fourteenth Amendment was indeed understood to 
 
 249  West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394. 
 250  See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 251  See supra notes 208–216 and accompanying text. 
 252  See James W. Fox, Jr., Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions of 
Equal Citizenship in the Era of Jim Crow, 50 HOW. L.J. 113, 125 (2006) (“Moreover, 
Congress continued to flesh out its understanding of citizenship through its support 
for the Freedman’s Bureau, which provided legal, medical, educational, welfare, and 
other forms of support to the freed slaves, with the understanding that such 
provision was central to helping former slaves become full citizens.”).   
 253  See, e.g., Lester, supra note 209, at 90 (stating that the Reconstruction Congress 
created “the Bureau of Freedmen’s Affairs, whose purpose was to help blacks enforce 
lease and work contracts negotiated with whites, and to help rent blacks land that the 
Union Army had confiscated during the Civil War.”). 
 254  This held true despite much evidence that some of the Bureau’s work was 
actually detrimental to blacks’ ability to achieve independence and equal status.  See, 
e.g., AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND 
THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 36–38 (1998); Deborah A. Ballam, 
Exploding the Original Myth Regarding Employment-At-Will: The True Origins of the Doctrine, 
17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 104 (1996) (“[T]he Freedman’s Bureau was as 
concerned about ensuring a labor supply for employers as about protecting the 
freedmen.”); Amy Kapczynski, Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1091 n.190 (2005) (“Labor contracts administered by the 
Freedman’s Bureau made ‘free’ black labor conditional upon behavior that precisely 
echoed the social roles of slavery: laborers were to be ‘quiet’ and ‘respectable’ and 
‘well-behaved.’”).  
 255  Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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confer equality of citizenship upon women as well as men.  It was just 
that the contemporaries of the Amendment believed, due to their 
erroneous view about biological capabilities of women, that the 
equality is best achieved by “protecting” women.  When the predicate 
about biological and natural capabilities fell (as a result of acquired 
knowledge), so did the justification for “protective” laws.  The 
requirement of the equality of citizenship, however, remained.256 
C. Voting Rights 
The final objection I will address goes to the question of voting 
rights.  Today, we consider voting as an indispensable privilege and 
right of citizenship.  Accordingly, it is natural to object to my 
interpretation of the Citizenship Clause on the grounds that it makes 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,257 as well as Fifteenth258 and 
Nineteenth Amendments,259 redundant.  In other words, if citizenship 
implied equal treatment under the law, then perforce it required that 
all citizens were to be given equal access to the ballot box.  The 
argument essentially is that since that was not how the Citizenship 
Clause was understood, as evidenced by the inclusion of Section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the later drafting of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, the Clause could not have required equal treatment of 
all citizens. 
Again, this objection is alluring on its face, but is ultimately 
erroneous.  The reason is that, though it seems strange to us, in the 
1860s, citizenship did not imply the right of political participation, 
but was merely a necessary condition.260  Citizenship was concerned 
with civil not political rights.261  The fact that elective franchise was 
 
 256  This is similar to Bork’s Brown argument.  Even if the Reconstruction Congress 
thought that segregated schools could be equal, the requirement of equality was 
always present.  As the factual predicate was proven time and again to be false (i.e., 
segregated schools were never equal in fact) all that remained was the requirement 
of equality.  See supra notes 124–130 and accompanying text.  So too with gender-
based legislation.  The requirement of equality in civil rights between sexes was 
always present and understood by those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but it was implemented based on the erroneous factual premise.  When 
a more correct factual premise was recognized, the requirement of equality had to be 
implemented according to that premise.   
 257  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (providing for penalties for any state that denies 
the right to vote to any male citizen, but not prohibiting such an action). 
 258  U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting discrimination in voting on account of 
race or previous condition of servitude). 
 259  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (prohibiting discrimination in voting on account of 
sex). 
 260  See infra notes 265–267 and accompanying text. 
 261  See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John 
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held not to be part of the bundle of rights inherent in citizenship is 
evident from the Corfield case.262  According to Justice Washington, 
“the elective franchise” could only be exercised by citizens “as 
regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in 
which it is to be exercised.”263  This was the prevalent view at the time 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafting and ratification.264  For 
instance, Senator Jacob Howard stated that “[t]he right of suffrage is 
not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the 
Constitution.  It is merely the creature of law.  It has always been 
regarded in this country as the result of positive local law . . . .”265  
Senator Lyman Trumbull was equally adamant.  According to him, 
“the granting of civil rights does not, and never did in this country, 
carry with it rights, or, more properly speaking, political privileges.  A 
man may be a citizen in this country without a right to vote or without 
a right to hold office.”266  On the House side, Representative Martin 
Russell Thayer stated that “nobody can successfully contend that a bill 
guarantying simply civil rights and immunities is a bill under which 
you could extend the right of suffrage, which is a political privilege 
and not a civil right.”267 
In short, the Fourteenth Amendment was not actually meant to 
provide equality of political rights such as the right to vote and hold 
office.  For the exercise of those rights, citizenship was a necessary 
but not sufficient condition.  Because the concept of citizenship was 
 
Bingham’s Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 742 (2003) (Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment “differentiated ‘civil rights,’ centering on the right to 
participate in the legal system in such basic means as entering into contracts and 
owning real property, from ‘political’ rights like the right to vote.  Only the former 
‘civil’ rights were considered to adhere to federal citizenship”).  
 262  See David R. Upham, Note, Corfield v. Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities 
of American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1524–25 (2005) (“[Corfield] does not 
clearly designate the right to vote as a ‘fundamental’ right of citizenship—and with 
good reason: it never belonged to all citizens as citizens.”).   
 263  Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
 264  See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Dred Scott: Tiered Citizenship and Tiered Personhood, 
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 221 (2007) (“[A]t the time of its passage, the Fourteenth 
Amendment demanded equality only with respect to a narrow set of rights defined as 
legal and civil rights, not wholesale equality with respect to social and political 
rights.”); Douglas G. Smith, Originalism And The Affirmative Action Decisions, 55 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1, 28 (2004) (“[T]he framers of the amendment specifically stated 
that it would not guarantee the right to vote or to hold office.  This was part of a 
broader conceptual framework that viewed such ‘political’ rights as not being 
inherent in the concept of citizenship.”) (footnote omitted); Upham, supra note 262 
at 1524–25 (stating that the right to vote “never belonged to all citizens as citizens”).  
 265  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 
 266  Id. at 1757.  
 267  Id. at 1151. 
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not meant to include political rights, it does not seem strange at all 
that the Fifteenth and the Nineteenth Amendments were needed to 
extend the right to vote to blacks and women, respectively.  Nor does 
the lack of equal access to the ballot box for all citizens undermine 
the contention that the Citizenship Clause was understood to bestow 
the right to be treated equally by the government.  To be sure, the 
right of equal treatment promised by the Citizenship Clause was 
narrower than the present society would likely adopt, but that does 
not mean that the right did not exist at all. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The assertion that Bolling v. Sharpe “was a clear rewriting of the 
Constitution by the Warren Court” are flatly wrong.268  Bolling v. 
Sharpe is quite consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment as 
understood by those that drafted and ratified it.  The problem was 
not the Constitution (as Bork asserts) but a poorly reasoned (though 
unquestionably correct in result) opinion in Bolling.  To be fair to the 
Warren Court, the fault lies not just with it, but with previous courts 
and with the lack of scholarship on the history and the meaning of 
the Citizenship Clause (and for that matter, the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a whole).  A careful analysis of that history leads one 
to the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty on 
the federal government to protect the civil rights of its citizens on 
equal basis and without regard to skin color.  It is that understanding 
that allows a committed originalist to justify not just Brown but also 
Bolling and its progeny.  Bolling then is not the “silver bullet” that the 
philosophical opponents of originalism hoped it would be.  And so, 
although Judge Bork is wrong in his view of Bolling, originalism—the 
originalism that takes into account all of the clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—is not. 
 
 
 268  BORK, supra note 15, at 83. 
